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ABSTRACT
This study was designed to understand the response of the National School Lunch
Program (NSLP) and the Food Stamp Program (FSP) in southern Louisiana during Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. This study used portions of the PRECEDE/PROCEED model to develop the
questions for the interviews and interpret the barriers and enabling and reinforcing factors with
regard to changes in policy, budget, reporting, and program administration after the hurricanes.
Information collected from this research seeks, not only to contribute to the literature on this
topic, but to be made available to policymakers and program administrators to make informed
decisions.
The effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in southern Louisiana were catastrophic. They
were unusual in that the impact of the storms covered an extraordinary amount of the Gulf Coast
region and an enormous amount of people were affected.

In response to the catastrophe, two

federally mandated food assistance programs, the NSLP and FSP, released a series of waivers,
initiating a disaster program, which decreased eligibility requirements; therefore allowing more
people affected by the hurricanes to access the benefits.
One-on-one interviews were conducted with regional, state, and local program
administrators to understand the challenges and successes faces while implementing the disaster
programs. The study participants were asked to participate based on their roles, responsibilities,
and direct affect of either Hurricane Katrina, Rita, or both. Results of the study revealed the
speedy response of the USDA and community support led to the success of the programs. The
barriers that most administrators faced while trying to implement the programs were
infrastructure damage, lack of communication due to power outage and loss of cellular service,
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and lack of commerce in the area. Overall, both programs were successful in their commitment
to their underlying mission: increasing food access to those affected by the storms.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to depict qualitatively the successes and challenges of the
National School Lunch Program (NSLP) and the Food Stamp Program (FSP) in Louisiana in the
wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Nationally, the NSLP and the FSP are the two largest food
assistance program in the United States (US) (1). One-on-one interviews were conducted with
state, regional, and local administrators from Louisiana’s NSLP and FSP to understand the
responses of the programs during and after the hurricanes. A recount and analysis of the NSLP
and FSP disaster policy, changes in budget and reporting, and responses to shifts in program
administration and how they may have changed policies and procedures may reveal challenges
that should be addressed and successes that should be replicated.
Justification
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were unusual in that the impact of the storms covered an
extraordinary amount of the Gulf Coast region and an enormous number of people were affected
by the storms. During a disaster, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) typically
releases waivers that alter the programs to accommodate those affected. After Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita, the waivers released by the USDA relaxed eligibility requirements for the NSLP and
FSP, which as expected, profoundly increased participation (2).
South Louisiana is currently between the recovery phase and the mitigation phase of the
four phases of disaster management (3). During the recovery phase, actions are taken to restore
normalcy to a community after a disaster. Activities that involve planning and preparing for
future disasters occur during the mitigation phase (4). Since disasters, natural or man-made,
affect the way we live and work, it is important that independent research evaluates responses of
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the federal programs during emergencies. By doing this, challenges may be uncovered and
successes can be replicated.
Other than program integrity studies within the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS), there
is no other research on disaster and food assistance programs. Information collected from this
research seeks, not only to contribute to the literature on this topic, but to be made available to
policymakers and program administrators to make informed decisions.
Objectives
One-on-one interviews were conducted with state, regional, and local NSLP and FSP
administrators in southern Louisiana by using the PRECEDE/PROCEED model to:
1. Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances and the
predisposing factors of the NSLP and FSP disaster policies and procedures.
2. Determine the successful enabling and reinforcing factors associated with program
policy, budget, reporting, and administration delivery following Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita.
3. Find the barriers faced while trying to implement the programs and how they led to
changes in policy, budget, reporting, and administration.
Additionally, suggestions from the NSLP and FSP administrators’ interviews will be relayed
for future NSLP and FSP disaster policies and procedures.
Assumptions
The assumptions made prior to the study are:
1. Enrollment data were current and accurate.
2. Interviews were an effective method of collecting data to determine the NSLP and FSP
response in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
3. Interviewers’ responses were honest and unbiased.
2

4. The interviewees chosen were key informants to identify the barriers and predisposing,
enabling, and reinforcing factors of the response of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Limitations
1. The amount of time elapsed between the hurricanes and the interviews may have caused
perceptions of the event to change.
2. A snowball sampling technique was used to recruit participants.
3. Key NSLP informants from Orleans, St. Bernard, St. Tammany, Jefferson, and
Livingston Parishes did not participate in the study.
4. Key FSP informants from Louisiana’s Office of Family Support did not participate in the
study.
5. Two FSP interviews declined to have the interviews recorded; therefore, data analysis
from these interviews may have been impacted.
Definitions
1. Administrative Assessment: policies, resources and circumstances that may enable or
encumber the implementation of a health promotion program (5)
2. Disaster: a situation of hardship and human suffering arising from events which cause
physical loss or damage, social or economic disruption from which the country or
community is unable to cope with fully alone (6)
3. Disaster Area: an area declared by the President of the United States or a state governor
as a disaster; at this time that federal monies and programs are available to local
government (7).
4. Disaster Area Resident: a person who resides within a disaster area.
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5. Disaster Gross Income Limit: equals the sum of maximum monthly net income limit plus
the maximum standard income deduction amount and shelter expense deduction (8).
6. Emergency Management: the organization and administration of funds and
responsibilities in order to prepare, respond, and recover and mitigate in attempt to lessen
the impacts of disasters which may include life, property and community resources (9-10)
7. Food Purchasing (Buying) Power: a family’s or individual’s ability to purchase food for
consumption by means of job earnings or government assistance (11)
8. Food Stamp Program: a state/federal program designed to increase food purchasing
power for low-incomes families (1, 12-14)
9. Food Stamp Program Eligibility: benefits are determined by income, assets, and certain
allowable deductions (12-14)
10. Liquid Resource: includes cash on hand and in checking or savings accounts (12)
11. Policies: a high-level overall plan embracing the general goals and acceptable procedures
especially of a governmental body (15)
12. Procedure: a traditional or established way of doing things (15)
13. National School Lunch Program: federally assisted program that offers reimbursement to
the school foodservice program as long as meals meet certain nutritional requirements set
by the USDA; meals offered through the NSLP are lunch and after-school snacks (16)
14. National School Lunch Program Eligibility: any student attending a participating school
may receive federally subsidized lunches; depending on the families’ household income
the student may be eligible for free or reduced-cost lunch (16)
15. Nutrient Standard: required minimum number of calories and specific nutrients for a
specific grade or age group for a school lunch (17)
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16. School Food Authority: a Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) certified governing body
which is responsible for one or more schools’ foodservice operations, including the
NSLP requirements (17)
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
On Monday, August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina reached the United States’ Gulf Coast
region. The outer bands of the category-3 hurricane made landfall between Grand Isle, LA and
the Mississippi River delta, south of Buras, LA (14). As the eye of the hurricane moved inland,
hurricane force winds extended 120 miles from the eye. There were 10-12 inches of rain along
the path (2); however, the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina was from the storm surge, which
ranged between four and thirty feet (15). The storm surge led to breaches in the area’s levee
system. The subsequent flooding left some neighborhoods of Orleans, Jefferson, St. Bernard,
and Plaquemines Parishes under 20 feet of water (14, 15). The loss of property in the areas
surrounding the levee breeches was colossal. At Governor Kathleen Babineaux-Blanco’s
request, on August 26, 2005, the Federal Emergency Management Association (FEMA) declared
23 southeast Louisiana parishes disaster areas after Hurricane Katrina.

Figure 1: Photo of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina
(abc.net.au. October 31, 2006)
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Less than one month later, on September 24, 2005, the eye of Hurricane Rita made
landfall between Sabine Pass, TX and Johnson’s Bayou, LA. An additional 15 parishes in
southwest Louisiana parishes were declared disaster areas (16). The American Red Cross (ARC)
estimated that 345,000 homes were destroyed by the two storms (17).

Figure 2: Maps of federally declared disaster parishes in Louisiana after
Hurricanes Katrina (left) and Rita (right). Dark Orange Parishes are designated
for individual and public assistance. (FEMA, October 31, 2006)

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita left many residents in southern Louisiana without a home or
a place to work. In May 2006, it was estimated that over 200,000 Louisianans were homeless;
further more, over 71,000 businesses were adversely impacted and over 300,000 jobs were lost
(15). It is likely that Katrina impacted more than 1.37 million people. Hurricane Rita left an
additional 76,500 Louisianans homeless, and affected over 10,000 businesses in Louisiana; over
45,000 people in Louisiana lost their jobs.
Recovery in Louisiana
Unlike past hurricanes, residents were unable to return home within a few days after
Hurricane Katrina or Rita. Ten months after Hurricane Katrina, only one-fourth of the residents
of flood areas had returned to New Orleans (18). The security of long-term housing,
employment, and schools are influencing Louisianans to relocate permanently to other cities.
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The US census in 2000, gave Louisiana’s population as 4,468,976 (19). In July 2005, the
estimated state-wide population of Louisiana, one month prior to Hurricane Katrina, was
4,523,628. In January 2006, Louisiana’s Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) calculated
that the state’s population had decreased by 276,993 to total 4,246,635. The populations of
Calcasieu, Cameron, Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard Parishes have diminished
significantly. Population reports from Orleans Parish indicated a population decrease from over
447,000 to fewer than 157,000 (20-21). The most profound change in population occurred in St.
Bernard Parish, which has decreased by over 75% (22).
Because there is no national tracking mechanism for those who relocated after Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, is difficult to say where all of the displaced Louisianans are currently living
and working. The population of Baton Rouge, Houston, San Antonio, Birmingham, and Atlanta
increased after the hurricanes (23). Baton Rouge may have experienced the largest population
increase, doubling in size immediately after Katrina (20, 23). In August 2006, the US postal
service continued to forward the mail of over 72,000 residents of New Orleans’ to Baton Rouge.
An estimated 100,000 displaced residents remain in Baton Rouge (23-24). Immediately
following the storm, buses evacuated residents from the New Orleans Superdome directly to
Houston and San Antonio. Houston’s population initially increased by as much as 250,000 with
as many as 110,000 remaining there. At least 25,000 people evacuated to San Antonio and as
many as 18,000 are still there (23-24). Atlanta’s City Report estimates approximately 70,000
evacuees still lived in Atlanta in August 2006 (23, 25). There is no consensus about the
speculated population increase of Birmingham, AL. Estimates from Alabama’s Department of
Health suggest that the number is approximately 1,500 people, while FEMA estimates that this
number is closer to 13,000 (26-28).
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Countless reviews and reports have been published (18, 29-39) about the Gulf Coast,
New Orleans, and the lasting affects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Of these, the emerging
themes are (1) evaluating the response of the local and federal governments; (28-29) (2)
addressing the long-term needs of the evacuees, which includes sub-topics such as health care,
employment, and housing (30-34); (3) rebuilding New Orleans (34-37); (4) strengthening
technology and infrastructure for effective disaster management (38-39).
Federal Government’s Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
The costs of rebuilding the Gulf Coast Region are staggering. One year after the
hurricanes, it is estimated that the total costs will reach well over $200 billion (40). This is in
part due to the widespread area of the affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The Brookings
Institute calculated that over $108 billion has been committed by the US Congress for Hurricanes
Katrina, Rita, and Wilma recovery efforts (40). In an executive report published in May 2006, by
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the US Senate, Hurricane
Katrina revealed the “failure of government at all levels to plan, prepare for and respond
aggressively to the storm” (42). These failures were called insidious. A 2004, planning exercise,
“Hurricane Pam,” was sponsored by the federal government with participation from federal,
state, and local officials and was designed to create a hypothetical category-3 hurricane. Both the
Louisiana Department of Education and the Louisiana Department of Social Services were
recruited to participate in the drill. Its scenario anticipated hypothetical consequences of a
category-3 hurricane hitting New Orleans. Draft plans and lessons emerged during the exercise;
however, the report described them as incomplete or ignored when Hurricane Katrina hit the
Louisiana coast (42).
The slow and incongruent response to Hurricane Katrina led to the resignation of Michael
Brown from position of Undersecretary of Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR), a
9

position generally referred to as the director or administrator of FEMA, on September 12, 2005.
Secretary Michael Chertoff assumed all of Brown’s responsibilities. On November 1, 2005,
President George W. Bush named Donald Powell the Federal Coordinator of Gulf Coast
Rebuilding. This newly created position involves developing a long-term rebuilding plan for
Gulf Coast region, coordinating the federal efforts and assisting state and local officials develop
a vision for the region (40).
Federal Nutrition Programs
The USDA is a massive federally managed agency with an annual budget of over $38
billion (41). It is made up of offices and agencies that create and implement policies with overall
regard to: (1) farm and foreign agricultural services and (2) food, nutrition, and consumer
sciences. The FNS, an agency of the USDA, is comprised of seven food assistance programs,
which include the NSLP and the FSP, designed to reduce hunger by increasing food purchasing
power in low-income families. At any given time, an average of one out of every five persons in
the US participates in one of the FNS food assistance programs (42-43). The NSLP and the FSP
are the largest of the FNS programs. In FY 2005, the FSP accounted for $18 billion of the
USDA’s $38 billion overall budget (43) while the NSLP accounted for $7.9 billion (44).
The National School Lunch Program
The evolution of feeding programs in schools dates back to the 1870s in Germany, where
needy school children were supplied free food from an outside philanthropic group. In the early
1900s, England’s concern over the nations inability to meet the nutritional needs of the children,
led to a Provision of Meals Act. This too was an outside collaboration designed to feed needy
school aged children. In 1904, Robert Hunter published Poverty. His theory that the poverty of a
family was most serious when they were “obtaining the only education which they are ever to
receive,” resonated with government officials. Soon after, the first subsidized, reduced, and free
10

lunches were served in the US in Milwaukee and New York. By 1937, 15 states were authorized
to run kitchens and to serve lunch.
During the Great Depression of the 1930s, many families could not provide enough food
to adequately feed the entire family or enough money to pay for the children’s lunches at school.
Malnutrition was a serious national concern (43). The 74th Congress passed Public Law 320 in
August of 1936, to provide agricultural surplus, particularly wheat and milk, to schools. In
March 1937, 3,839 schools used these commodities to serve 342,031 children daily. By the end
of 1942, 92,916 schools were serving 5,272,540 students (43).
The federal government assigned the USDA to oversee and regulate school foodservice
in The Child Nutrition Act of 1966. The Act established standards for nutrition, sanitation,
management of funds, and overall program continuity. Requirements for reporting were defined
for all schools to submit a report to the state educational agency including the number of children
who received free and reduced lunches during the preceding month. The Act mandated that the
state agencies in turn submitted a report to the USDA.
The NSLP is currently active in 100,000 public, non-profit private school, and residential
child care centers in the US. The NSLP is managed by the FNS and administered by the Child
Nutrition Division (CND). They are responsible for reimbursing participating school food
authorities (SFA). All lunches served in participating school cafeterias in the US are subsidized
by the USDA. Schools are reimbursed $2.40 for every free lunch it serves. Schools receive
$2.00 for every reduced-price lunch and $.23 for all “full-cost” meals purchased. This rate is
subject to change at the end of the NSLP 2007 FY: June 30, 2007. In FY 2004, the cash
reimbursement totaled $7.1 billion dollars (45).
To receive reimbursement, schools must provide a lunch that meets specific nutritional
requirements. The school foodservice must use nutrient standards for the established grade
11

groups, i.e. preschool, grades K-6, and grades 7-12 (46). Meals contain about 30% of the daily
energy requirements for the grade groups. Total fat cannot exceed 30 percent of calories and the
total amount of saturated fat must be less than 10 percent of calories. Minimums are set for
protein, calcium, iron, vitamin A and vitamin C.
The Louisiana Department of Education (LADOE) is the state educational agency
responsible for managing the NSLP. FNS provides the state with both cash assistance and food
commodities (47). Cash payments are awarded to the states in two ways. General cash
assistance payments subsidize all lunches that are served to students. Special cash assistance
payments are paid to schools in amounts according to the number of students receiving free and
reduced lunches. In addition to cash payments, USDA commodity purchases are allocated
through the FNS Distribution Program and provide schools with about 15-20 percent of the food
schools serve in their meal programs (45).
To approve the reimbursement to the school, the LADOE is required to report
reconciliation to the FNS in monthly, quarterly, and annual reports. The monthly report is
submitted to FNS no later than 90 days after the last day of the month reported. No later than 30
days after the end of the fiscal quarter, the quarterly report is submitted. The annual report is
submitted to FNS 120 days after the close of the fiscal year (45).
Normally, this report must include:
1. Documentation of participation by school
2. Production, menu records, and nutritional analysis
3. Student participation records indicating one lunch per child
4. Up-to-date applications for free and reduced lunches (both denied and accepted)
5. Description of approved (“verified”) and denied applications, including the
approved/verified applications (45).
12

Prior to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the NSLP was operating in 1,200 sites through over
120 SFA in Louisiana (48). Louisiana adopted the national income eligibility guidelines set by
the FNS for the School Year (SY) 2004-2005 (48). The FNS defines income to include all
compensation and cash income (49-50). Households receiving benefits from additional federal
programs are not required to report the benefits as income (49). Students of families with total
incomes at 185% of the federal poverty guidelines are eligible for reduced lunch. Students of
families with incomes at 130% of the federal poverty guideline are eligible for free lunch (49).
Table 1: NSLP annual income requirements for free and reduced lunch in FY 2004-2005
Household Size
Reduced Lunch
Free Lunch
2
$23,107
$16,231
3
$28,990
$20,371
4
$34,873
$24,505
5
$40,756
$28, 639
6
$46,639
$32,773
Under normal, non-disaster circumstances, children can either be directly certified by
school officials or are required to submit an application determining income eligibility. Direct
certification bypasses the formal application process by using documentation indicating the
families’ participation in the FSP (50). The SFA or school must keep a list of all of the students
who are directly certified. Verified applications are also kept on file for other students receiving
free or reduced-price lunch. Students may also receive temporary certification if the family
experiences a disruption in their normal income, which may include layoffs, disability, or zero
income. If zero income is claimed, the school must contact the household after a specified time
period, generally 45 days, in order to determine whether income status has changed (49-50).
NSLP and Disasters. Under disaster circumstances, or when damage demands exceeds
the availability of the local resources (51), the disaster policies and procedures of the NSLP are
initiated (52). The governor of the affected state is responsible for asking the President of the US
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for assistance. The President follows guidelines outlined by the FEMA in order to make the
assessment as to whether the state requires resources from the federal government.
If a disaster creates an environment where the nutritional needs of the community cannot
be met through normal means, USDA commodities may be used from the NSLP inventory. The
American Red Cross (ARC) may set up temporary kitchens and shelters in schools for mass
feedings. The FNS guarantees financial reimbursement to a SFA/school that lends food to other
SFA/school or to the ARC for congregate feeding (52). If schools require additional food due to
the loss of influx of students, commodities can be shifted between SFA and states that weren’t
affected by the disaster in order to ensure that lunches are served to students (52).
In August 2005, the LADOE updated Title 28, Part XLIX, Bulletin 1196: the Louisiana
Food and Nutrition Programs, Policies of Operation. Chapter 31 (Appendix A) discusses
disaster feeding and includes a section on emergency shut down procedures, food salvage, and
shelter operations. In section 3109 of the guide, the state recommends that the LADOE Director
of the Child Nutrition Program develop and write a Disaster Feeding Plan to include 20
objectives. Topics include: communication systems (cell phone, radio), contact information,
emergency shut down procedures, commodities, shelter procedures, and post-disaster cleaning.
In anticipation of a disaster, FNS Headquarters (national), regional, and state distribution
agencies are asked to make general preparations. The FNS national office identifies a Disaster
Coordinator and establishes an emergency contact list with back-ups from the USDA Kansas
City Commodity Office. The national office anticipates a number of people that may be affected
by the disaster and who may require emergency food assistance. If a state experiences
widespread electrical or cellular service loss, the regional offices can act as the liaison for the
state office (52). Ongoing communication between the state level and the regional offices is
highly encouraged, although methods for communicating with widespread power outages have
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not been established. In 2004, a system to ensure that the foods provided during an emergency
met the USDA’s dietary guidelines did not exist (42).
Unlike some disasters, hurricanes’ paths can be tracked and intensity can be predicted. If
a hurricane is predicted to hit Louisiana, the LADOE asks that each school report to the SFA
their inventory of all commodities (42). This information is passed to the state and regional
offices, as well as the Food Distribution Division (FDD). Prior to Hurricane Katrina and Rita
specifically, the LADOE suggested preparation activities; i.e. secure a generator for
refrigeration, stock paper and plastic products, create a list of food inventory and prepare order
for any shortages, print and save to a diskette or CD, a copy of inventory, students’ lunch
identification numbers (IDs), and account balances. Prior to the disaster, the schools are advised
to use most or all of the fresh produce, perishable foods, and frozen leftovers (42, 53).
The Food Stamp Program
Primitive versions of the modern the USDA’s FSP began in the 1930s in order to
alleviate poverty and hunger during The Great Depression. After nearly 30 years of pilot
programs, on January 31, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson requested Congress to pass
legislation making the FSP permanent. Although, the public law’s purpose was advertised to
strengthen the agricultural economy and to increase food purchasing power among low-income
households; its primary function was to bring the pilot program under federal control. The Food
Stamp Act of 1964 stated that each state developed its own eligibility requirements; recipients of
the program must purchase stamps; only foods fit for human consumption, no alcoholic
beverages, or imported foods can be purchased with the stamps; and that the costs of
administrating the program would be shared between states and the federal government. During
the first year, $75 million was appropriated for the program. This increased to $100 million in
the second year and by the third year $300 million dollars were appropriated for the program.
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The US Congress passed the Food Stamp Act of 1977 (Public Law # S. 275) (54). Its
underlying purpose was to eliminate the purchase requirement for the food stamps. Along with
this, the Act detailed income and resource (such as vehicles) eligibility requirements, retailer
obligations, and mandated that states develop a disaster plan. In 1979, FSP participation
surpassed 20 million people and in 1994, it reached a new high of 28 million people. Over 24
million people in the United States participated in the FSP in fiscal year (FY) 2004 (55). Before
Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, the FSP had on average 25.8 million participants (54).
While eligibility guidelines are set nationally and defined in the Department of
Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Code of Federal Regulation, 7 CFR 273.20 (56), it is the
responsibility of the individual state to administer the program locally (54). Each state
determines the agency that will manage FSP operations. In Louisiana, the Office of Family
Support (OFS) within the Department of Social Services (DSS) operates the FSP. The state’s
responsibilities include certification, coupon transfer, complaints, employee training, reporting
reviews and reports, and maintaining detailed records in order to determine whether the program
is in compliance with federal regulations (42).
As of July 2005, or the first month of the FSP Fiscal Year (FY) 2006, a household in
Louisiana was eligible for Food Stamps as long as they meet certain resource and income tests
(42). A household can have access to a maximum of $2000 in a bank account or $3000 if one
member of the family is at least 60 years of age or disabled. Houses, vehicles, or additional
income from the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) do not count towards these resources (57).
The household is defined by gross and net income, supplemental income, age, and
disability (58). Gross income is the household’s total income without deductions. A total of
20% of the gross earnings may be deducted from the net income, which may decrease total
earnings and increase benefits. This is referred to as the Earned Income Deduction (58). The
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Standard Deduction is $134 for a household with one to four members and increases with
additional family members. Deductions can be made for medical reasons, child care, child
support, and shelter. The net income equals the gross income minus the deductions (58).
Table 2: FSP monthly gross and net income requirements to be eligible for food stamp benefits
in FY 2004-2005
Household Size
Gross Monthly Household Income
Net Income Household Income
(130% of Federal Poverty Level)
1
$1,037
$798
2
$1,390
$1,070
3
$1,744
$1,341
4
$2,097
$1,613
5
$2,535
$1,950
6
$2,904
$2,234
7
$3,272
$2,517
8
$3640
$2,800
Each additional
+369
+284
person
Louisiana’s FSP enrollee benefits are issued through an Electronic Benefits Transfer
(EBT) card system, branded the Louisiana Purchase Card (59). It is designed and used similarly
to a bank debit card. Recipients receive the food stamp benefits once during the first fourteen
days of the month. Each recipient receives their benefits on the same day each month as long as
they are enrolled in the program uninterruptedly. Eligible applicants or those with little or no
money in Louisiana receive food stamp benefits within four days after the DSS receives the
application. Those who are not eligible will receive notification within thirty days. During
emergency situations, the benefits are accessible immediately (59). To protect the enrollee’s
benefits from fraudulent use, a Personal Identification Number (PIN) is issued and used at Point
of Sale (POS) machines where food is purchased. Purchases are debited immediately and the
remaining balance is printed on the receipt (59). In October 2005, Louisiana’s FSP had
authorized over 3,700 food retailers for use of the Louisiana Purchase Card (60).
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In June 2005, the end of Louisiana’s FY 2005, the state FSP had served over 3.2 million
people. Louisiana’s 2003 FY served over 2.7 million and almost 3.1 million in FY 2004 (45).
Compared with other states, Louisiana ranked 14th in overall participation.
Disaster Food Stamp Program. Section 11(e) of the Food Stamp Act of 1977 mandated
that all USDA regional offices submit an updated disaster plan by August 15th each year (60).
Although it is the ultimate responsibility of the state agency running a FSP, the USDA
recommends collaboration among USDA headquarters, regional offices, local food stamp
offices, FEMA, and other federal or advocacy organizations (61).
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act was established in
1988 to assist all state and local governments, including the USDA, and their citizens during a
disaster (62). Its overall objective is to reduce damage to humans and land during and while
responding to a disaster. Subchapter III permits federal assistance programs to waive
administrative activities during a disaster if it is determined necessary. The Disaster Food Stamp
Program (DFSP) is an example of a waiver permitted by this public law.
To get disaster area status in a state, the governor must make is request to the President
through the regional FEMA office (9). If the President consents to the governor’s request, the
area affected by the disaster is officially declared an area a federal disaster area (60). It is
possible to initiate a disaster without the President’s authority. The Secretary of Agriculture may
choose to operate a DFSP if methods of local food distribution have been interrupted (60).
In May 1995, the USDA approved a massive Disaster Food Stamp Program Manual. It
includes regional and state pre-disaster planning, disaster response, and recovery. The document
includes checklists and sample floor plans, and recommendations for crowd control and staffing
(50).
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In October 2000, the FNS published a voluntary EBT Disaster Plan Guide offering
guidance to states interested in issuing food stamps with EBT during a disaster (38). The EBT
Disaster Food Stamp Program asked that states:
1) develop a user-friendly system for recipients, as well as state and county staff.
2) locate a storage facility to stock EBT cards in order to respond to the increased demand
during an emergency. The FNS suggests to the state that a system should be designed so
that there is a maximum three day turnover from the time of application until issuance of
EBT.
3) network information on the web and through off-line reports detailing eligibility; thus
providing a smooth transition during or after the disaster (9).
The flexibility of a disaster program allows the requirements to adjust to the needs of the
circumstance. To be eligible for the DFSP, specific requirements must be met, which differ from
than of the regular FSP. Table 3 summarizes the requirements and differences.
Four Phases of Disaster
The key objective in emergency management is to protect life and alleviate suffering.
The second goal is to reduce damage to infrastructure and to the environment (26, 63).
Emergency management focuses on the actions that occur before the emergency, during the
emergency, and after the emergency (63).
Prior to an anticipated hurricane or disaster occurs, the first phase of the emergency
management is implemented. This is the mitigation phase which involves planning and
preparedness (63). This involves a sketch of the possible outcomes of hurricane including
considerations to hazard assessment (64). Using previous emergency response successes and
failures, as well as scientific literature, pre-disaster sketches can be depicted to include the
possible consequences of the impact, such as infrastructure damage (64-65).
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Table 3: Summary of Requirements and Differences of the DFSP and FSP
Eligibility
FSP
DSFP
Disaster Status
n/a
One of the following
• Damage to home or self-employment
property
• Disaster related expenses
• Income disruption
• Inaccessible resources
Residency
• Project area
• Disaster area
• Verified
• Verified if possible
Household
Defined by 7 CFR
• Members of household who are living and
273.20
eating together during disaster
• Does not include members with whom the
applicants are temporarily staying during
the disaster
Benefit
Calculation according to Maximum allotment for household size
7 CFR 273.20
Students
Calculation according to Status not applicable
7 CFR 273.20
SS #
Failure to provide may
Failure to provide may not result in
lead to disqualification
disqualification
Work
Yes
No
Requirements
Resources
• Not to exceed $2000
• Total income plus resources cannot exceed
(non-elderly in
disaster gross income limit
household)
• Only liquid resources are counted
• Not to exceed $3000
• No special provisions for elderly or
(elderly in household)
handicapped
Expenses
Deductions include:
• Maximum standard and shelter expenses
standard earned income,
• Non-reimbursable disaster related expenses
excess shelter, dependant
care, and medical (for
elderly and disabled
recipients only)

Preparedness relies deeply on the extensiveness of the planning. This phase incorporates
the planned sketches with actions to reduce damage and compromise to the program. In order
for the action plan to translate into response, immediate resources, i.e. money from Washington,
access to food, must be available immediately upon request.
The phase that is initiated during or immediately (within hours) following the disaster is
the response phase. The ultimate activity during this phase is to provide emergency and speedy
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assistance to all of those who were directly or indirectly affected by the disaster (49). The speed
to which normalcy returns combined with the reduction of the likelihood that secondary damage
will occur is the ultimate goals of the response phase. It is usually regarded as short-term
reactions and solutions. This can mean temporary policy changes in order to feed or increase
food purchasing power to those affected directly or indirectly by the disaster. Because of the
nature of the environment immediately following a disaster, this is a very vulnerable phase in the
overall management of the emergency (66). During this phase, support from the community can
be an important factor determining movement to the recovery phase (66).
Once those affected by the hurricane are stabilized and the program’s systems return to
normalcy, the recovery process can initiate. This phase typically involves long-term activities
and may continue for several years (49). Revisiting and evaluating the response phase can
potentially further the progression from normalcy to improvement (49). Improvement occurs
when evaluation from the recovery phase in considered as the mitigation phase recharges the
emergency management cycle. The 4 phases of disaster management is depicted in Appendix B.
Interviews in Qualitative Research
Interviews are used to collect data for qualitative research (67). Semi-structured
interviews, while designed in advance, offer the researcher flexibility during the interview to
follow each question with an additional probing question (67-69). Semi-structured interviews are
often used in qualitative methodology to gain insight to experiences, knowledge, and opinions of
program implementation (67). The questions in this study were designed to reveal the
experiences, knowledge, and insight about the NSLP and the FSP in the wake of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. This type of design is called a phenomenological interview (67). It is preferred
over a multiple-choice questionnaire, since often times the interviewee can offer more depth than
what a multiple-choice questionnaire can provide (67).
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In all types of interviews, the interviewer is the instrument through which data are
collected (67, 70). The guides are useful tools when time is limited and to maintain focus
through a multifaceted discussion (70). Prior to the interview, an interview guide is carefully
constructed. In general, semi-structured interviews start with a few broad questions and lead to
more specific questions. Questions are open-ended to encourage thorough responses. The
usefulness of the data is determined by the researcher and the research team (70).
A probing question is one that follows the main question to elicit a deeper meaning (69).
The researcher may repeat the interviewee’s response in their own words to imply understanding.
The act of repeating may reveal parts of the question that were originally unexplained. The
participant can then choose to add details (67). The researcher may also choose to select parts of
the interviewee’s response to focus on for greater understanding.
Probing also adds to the interview a human element that can provide the rapport to
strengthen a qualitative interview (68). It is important for the researcher to maintain a balance
so that in-depth information is given and rapport is established, while at the same time the
interviewer does not come across as intrusive (69).
The researcher decides how to record the data collected during an interview. Audio
taping is frequently the desired medium and it often relieves the researcher from extensive notetaking (68, 54). It can also serve as a memory tool when notes are incomplete. Careful scrutiny
of the recordings can decipher nuances and tones set by the participant (68, 54).
Transcribing the recorded interviews is a useful tool in the analysis of qualitative data
(55). From the transcriptions, the researcher searches for emerging patterns of experiences and
themes (55). The researcher should stop conducting interviews when: (1) resources or possible
participants have been exhausted; (2) patterns and themes emerge and no new information is
learned; (3) the data begin to exceed the scope of the purpose of the study (54).
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For the purpose of qualitative research, interviews have benefits and limitations. Openended interviews allow the researcher to develop a deeper understanding of topics (64). In
addition, qualitative evaluation may help the researcher to explain quantitative results, such as
enrollment or participation. Often times the data can produce unpredicted results that lead a
researcher to future studies (72).
In terms of limitations, probing encourages interviewees to elaborate. Their elaborations
may provide information that is unnecessary or beyond the scope of the study (67, 73). It is the
role of the interviewer to explain why data are omitted. Another limitation in the use of
interviews in qualitative evaluation is the researcher’s role in collecting and interpreting the data
(72). Bias can ensue as the researcher takes field notes or while listening to the audiotapes,
focusing on topics of interest or personal values (72). Thus, the results of the data can be
unreliable and invalid.
Because empirical research is limited on the topic of federal food assistance programs
and disaster program evaluation, few of these types of studies have incorporated interviews in
their study design. However, as an overall evaluation tool, interviews and focus group
discussions are among the most common qualitative tools (67-67, 73).
Theoretical Model: PRECEDE/PROCEED
The PRECEDE/PROCEED theoretical model is a two-part, nine-step approach to health
promotion (74) (Figure 3). The PRECEDE portion of the model works backwards from step 1,
which addresses the health needs and objectives of a community or individual. PRECEDE is an
acronym standing for Predisposing, Reinforcing, Enabling Constructs in
Educational/Environmental Diagnosis and Evaluation. The second portion of the model or the
PROCEED component starts at step 6 and takes into account the implementation and evaluation
of an intervention. PROCEED is an acronym for Policy, Regulatory, Organizational Constructs
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in Educational and Environmental Development (74). The complete model is depicted in Figure
3. For the purpose of this study, only Step 6- 9 of the PROCEED portion of the model will be
considered and are illustrated in Figures 8 (NSLP) and 9 (FSP).
The PROCEED portion of the PRECEDE/PROCEED model begins with Step 6. It is at
this time, plans PROCEED to implementation and evaluation (74-75). In our study, it was
during step 6, that disaster plans were executed and USDA waivers were applied. Step 7, or the
process evaluation phase, uses three factors to evaluate the process by which the program, or
disaster plan, was implemented. The three characteristics or factors that are most likely to
influence behavior are predisposing, reinforcing, and enabling factors. Predisposing factors
motivate the behavior and include psychological indicators, such as culture and past experience.
Reinforcing factors are the perceived positive or negative outcome of the behavior once the
behavior has begun. Social support and symptom relief are examples of reinforcing factors.
Reinforcing factors often act as incentives to continue the behavior. Enabling factors may
include policy, waivers, and accessibility (74-75). Enablers can either be considered an aid or a
hindrance to the implementation of the program.
The influence of these factors can inhibit or lead to risk factors associated with program
implementation. Step 8, the impact evaluation phase, measures program effectiveness with
regard to risk factors associated with changes in predisposing, enabling, and reinforcing factors.
The two risk factors evaluated in this phase are behavioral and environmental. Behavior
indicators include compliance and coping. Examples of environment indicators include
infrastructure damage and services (74).
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Figure 3: The PRECEDE/PROCEED Model adapted from Green LW, Kreuter MW, 1999
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Step 9
Outcome
Evaluation

The final step in the PRECEDE/PROCEED Model is step 9, the outcome evaluation
phase. Assessments are made on the changes in the quality of life and health.
Since the development of the PRECEDE/PROCEED model in the 1970s, the model has
been used in more than 700 scientific articles. It is a valid model for program evaluation and
implementation. For example, the PRECEDE/PROCEED Model has been used at a health fair in
Mexico City to address the health needs of community and measure the effectiveness of the
intervention (74-75). The model has also been used to assess the acceptance computer tailoring
as a health education intervention (76). This model is a well established and used
internationally for the assessment, implementation and evaluation of nutrition interventions (7475). We were unable to find studies incorporating the PRECEDE/PROCEED model for
evaluating federally mandated programs after a disaster.
Evaluation and Disaster
Evaluation is a tool for researchers to use to gain insight to the target population’s
experiences and to determine the effectiveness a program implementation (77). Summative
evaluation uses information collected at the end of an implemented program and can help
prepare for program revisions (78). Summative evaluation is an appropriate for disaster
evaluation. Formative evaluation would shift the focus from response and recovery to
evaluation. Summative evaluation is the focus of this study since the disaster program of the
NSLP and FSP were completed at the start of the evaluation. In addition to determining
effectiveness, summative evaluation allows identifying or highlighting specific indicators that
need to be addressed prior to future program implementation.
After September 11, 2001, an exploratory study was conduced with crisis counselors
from Project Liberty (PL) in order to identify thematic issues for future program planning (81).
Moynihan et al. conducted two focus groups in the Bronx, NY in order to gain insight to the
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work that the counselors (n=9) at the crisis center performed after the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001. The focus groups were taped and transcribed. Five themes emerged from
the study: (1) perceived marginalization of the Bronx Community, (2) role diffusion due to
competing demands and needs, (3) 9/11 as a socially acceptable way to express symptoms of
psychological distress, (4) burdens of care, and (5) job satisfaction. The responses from the
evaluation indicated that the counselors expressed both positive and negative experiences while
working at PL. Many of the counselors suggested that they felt that this type of work was
needed and they were likely to participate in outreach services again in the future. A common
negative response was the lack of support, as much of the staff was “ill equipped, untrained, and
unprepared” (81).
The themes that emerged from the focus group were an important consideration in the
overall snapshot of the PL inner workings. The researchers noted that the intent of PL and the
roles of the crisis counselors were not clearly defined prior to program implementation which
may have led to some of the negative experiences during the length of the program. Moreover,
their suggestions for future disaster-related programs indicated that the counselors can be more
responsive to their clients if the programs are designed to continuously respond to stresses,
frustrations, and successes with workers and administration.
The qualitative design had limitations. The agencies in the Bronx, NY were selected
because of their proximity to the disaster site. Fewer residents of the Bronx were directly
affected by the attacks and may have been a less sensitive topic to those coping with the disaster
(81). Clients of PL in the Bronx may have required different needs from those residents within
closer proximity to the disaster. Finally, the small sample size may not be generalizable to the
other agencies that implemented a PL (81).
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Summative evaluation was also used to describe the experiences of program managers of
community-based earthquake preparedness organizations in the Bay Area of San Francisco, CA
(82). Community-based earthquake preparedness organizations in the Bay Area were asked to
participate in an earthquake drill on April 20, 1996. A press release described the hypothetical
earthquake scenario. It included its magnitude (7.1), location (Hayward fault), duration (30
seconds), damage (extensive), deaths (1,500-4,400), and people needing hospitalization (4,50012,000) (82).
The goal of the earthquake simulation was to test the organizations preparations or to
refresh emergency response skills. On the Monday following the simulated drill, a survey was
mailed to the 48 operating neighborhood earthquake preparedness organizations. Of the 48 drill
participants, 45 completed and returned the survey. From the 45 returned surveys, 17 of them
participated in “Drill Day” in their community. The 17 community centers were telephoned with
a follow up interview (82) with a 100% response rate.
The questions on the interview guide elicited information regarding: (1) location of
program leadership, (2) goals and training, (3) volunteers, and (4) targeted organizational unit.
The responses were analyzed qualitatively. The telephone interview revealed that over half of
the communities simulated injuries. Fire stations, schools, and Emergency Operation Centers
(EOC) were recruited and played an active role in the drill activities. The level of participation
in the community varied and was positively linked to Drill Day’s promotion (82).
Promotion was determined to be a consistent problem reported by the program managers.
In this study, promotion was defined as advertisement. For a majority of the communities,
recruiting volunteers to participate was not a challenge. Five of the 17 groups reported that
enrolling participants was problematic. Logistics, resources or the allocation of the resources, as
expected, were among the problems reported most often.
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Insightful recommendations for future earthquake drills emerged from the telephone
surveys. Two different community centers recommended setting up a Drill Day committee who
would head the logistics, resources, and publicity. Several respondents hoped to recruit
volunteers to lead a drill on their residential block. Less experienced response teams suggested
starting with a discussion or a “tabletop drill,” as running the functions of the drill and training
volunteers simultaneously was disorganized (82).
Drill Day and the subsequent study had limitations. The earthquake simulation rarely
involves neighborhood residents, which means fewer members of the community are exposed to
preparation activities. Staff members of the EOC are involved, but during an actual disaster,
some or all may not be able to participate in mitigation activities. It is difficult to hypothesize a
realistic situation, as all of the surveyed community organizations simulated were manageable
(82).
Both of these studies used interviews for program evaluation after a disaster. While they
had limitations, they were able to elicit qualitatively themes that presented an overall picture of
the program. In addition to the themes, insightful recommendations for future programs were
provided from those involved in program implementation. And while neither mentioned followup studies, the themes that emerged from the studies deserve future investigation.
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CHAPTER 3
PARTICIPANTS AND METHODS

Institutional Review Board Approval
The study was approved by the Louisiana State University (LSU) AgCenter Institutional
Review Board (IRB) (#HE06-10). A copy of the submitted form can be found in Appendix C.
National School Lunch Program
Participants
Local and state administrators from Louisiana’s NSLP were asked to participate in the
interviews. Prior to each interview, an information sheet was provided and a consent from was
signed by the interviewer and participant. Each interview was conducted privately with only the
interviewer and participant present.
The first NSLP interview was conducted on March 8, 2006, with the Director of School
Food Services for the LADOE, Division of Nutrition Assistance (DNA). She provided a list of
Louisiana SFA supervisors and directors who might be able to participate in the interviews.
From the list provided by the LADOE, SFA supervisors were chosen to represent a range of
experiences based on area of jurisdiction, which hurricane affected region, and changes in
enrollment (Table 4). The hurricane that affected the region was determined by the path of the
hurricane and the location of the parish. The areas that were affected by changes in enrollment
were based on information provided by the Director of School Food Services.
The SFA Director from Orleans Parish declined participation in the study. The SFA
Supervisor from St. Bernard Parish resigned prior to Hurricane Katrina and no one was available
for participation from that parish. The SFA from St. Tammany Parish (Director), Jefferson
Parish (Asst. Superintendent of Operations), and Livingston Parish (Supervisor) did not respond
to attempts to contact them.
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Figure 4: Reference Map of Louisiana Parishes (Courtesy of
www.state.la.us. November 15, 2006)

Interview Design
The NSLP interview (Appendix D) was designed to use the information from the
implementation of disaster policy to evaluate the factors with which predisposed, enabled,
hindered or reinforced the system administration during the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Semi-structured, open-ended questions were designed based in part on topics (program policy,
budget, reporting, and administration) and then guided by step 7 in the PRECEDE/PROCEED
model. Step 7 from the PRECEED/PROCEED model was isolated in this study to identify the
factors (predisposing, enabling/barriers, and reinforcing) that are required to initiate change (67).
Table 5 lists simplified versions of the NSLP questions, matched objective and the identifying
factor.
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Table 4: NSLP administrators chosen based on area of jurisdiction, which hurricane affected
region, and changes in enrollment in chronological order of interviews.
Hurricane
Change in
Interviewee Title
Area of Jurisdiction
Perspective
Enrollment
Director of Food
Services, Louisiana
Hurricanes Katrina
Department of
State
n/a
and Rita
Education, Division of
Nutrition Assistance
Cameron Parish SFA
Cameron Parish
Hurricane Rita
Loss
Supervisor
Vermilion, Iberia, St.
Mary, Acadia, St.
Lafayette Diocese SFA
Hurricane Katrina
Martin, Evangeline, St.
Increase
Supervisor
and Rita
Landry, Lafayette
Parishes
St. Martin Parish SFA
Hurricane Katrina
St. Martin Parish
Increase
Supervisor
and Rita
Jefferson, Orleans,
Director of School Food
Plaquemines, St.
and Nutrition Services
Bernard, St. Charles,
of New Orleans
Hurricane Katrina
Loss
St. John the Baptist, St.
(Archdiocese of New
Tammany, and
Orleans)
Washington Parishes
Director of Food
Hurricanes Katrina
State
n/a
Distribution Division
and Rita
East Baton Rouge
East Baton Rouge
Hurricanes Katrina
Parish SFA Assistant
Increase
Parish
and Rita
Director
St. Charles Parish SFA
St. Charles Parish
Hurricane Katrina
Increase
Director
St. James Parish SFA
St. James Parish
Hurricane Katrina
Increase
Supervisor
Tangipahoa Parish SFA
Tangipahoa Parish
Hurricane Katrina
Increase
Director

The interview questions were grouped according to the identifying factors. The factors
include:
1. Policy (P)
2. Budget (B)
3. Reporting (R)
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4. Program administration (PA)
5. Suggestions for future disaster planning. (FDP)
The final NSLP survey consisted of 30 questions (P=7, B=6, R=1, PA=13, FDP=1). In
addition, question #29 solicited additional information from the participant that was not covered
in the discussion. Question #30 asked the participant to make recommendations for others to
interview. Due to the semi-structured nature of the survey, after each question the interviewer
probed additional questions for additional clarity and understanding as necessary.
Interview Discussions
Prior to the interview, an electronic version of the respective interview was e-mailed to
the participant. An appointment was scheduled either by e-mail or by phone call. At the
beginning of each interview, the participant was given an information sheet, which included
contact information, to read and discuss before signing a consent form (Appendix F). A copy of
the consent form was provided to the participant for their records. Participants were then
interviewed. Two recording, digital and analog, devices were used in each of the interviews. In
additional, detailed field notes were taken.
Analysis
Following the interviews, digital tapes were transcribed verbatim. Analog tapes were
compared to the digital tapes and field notes to enhance clarity and understanding. Each of the
responses were grouped by question number and by identified factor and then compared.
Frequency of responses and themes were identified. Interviewees’ responses to questions were
also classified as predisposing, enabling, or reinforcing factors for the successful execution of the
NSLP after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
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Table 5: NSLP Interview Questions by number, paraphrased questions, matched objective, and identified factor
#
Condensed Question and Matched Objective
Identified Factor
What emergency/disaster preparations were in place prior to Katrina? Objective #1:
1
Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and
Predisposing
FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
What enabled the success of the program after Katrina? Objective #2: Determine the
2
successful reinforcing, predisposing and enabling factors associated with program policy,
Enabling
budget, reporting, and administration delivery following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
3
What barriers were faced while trying disaster plan after Hurricane Katrina? Objective #3:
Find the barriers faced while trying to implement the programs and how they led to
Enabling
changes in policy, budget, reporting, and administration.
4
Did post-Hurricane Katrina barriers lead to changes in policy? Objective #1: Obtain an
administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the
Enabling
wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
5
Were changes (#4) temporary or permanent? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative
assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of
Enabling
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
6
Did Hurricane Rita compound or reinforce any changes? Objective #2: Determine the
successful reinforcing, predisposing and enabling factors associated with program policy,
Enabling
budget, reporting, and administration delivery following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
7
What enabled the success after Hurricane Rita? Objective #2: Determine the successful
reinforcing, predisposing and enabling factors associated with program policy, budget,
Enabling
reporting, and administration delivery following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
8
What barriers were faced while trying to implement the disaster plan after Hurricane Rita?
Objective #3: Find the barriers faced while trying to implement the programs and how
Enabling
they led to changes in policy, budget, reporting, and administration.
9
Did these post-Hurricane Rita barriers lead to changes in policy? Objective #1: Obtain an
administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the
Reinforcing
wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
(Table 5, con’t)
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10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

Were these changes (#9) temporary or permanent? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative
assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
What parts of the disaster policy were designed for decisions to be made by the parish?
District? School? How was this dependant on the nature or degree of the disaster or
emergency? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and
circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Did Hurricane Katrina require the LADOE to re-budget federal and state NSLP funds
among parishes? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and
circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
How did re-budgeting (#12) affect Louisiana’s ability to offer free and reduced lunch in the
2005-2006 school year? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies
and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Will the changes in the policy and budget affect future national, state, or local disaster
policy? If so, how? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and
circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Will the changes in the policy and budget after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita affect future
national, state, or local disaster policy? If so, how? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative
assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Will these changes in the NSLP policy and budget affect Louisiana’s ability to feed
school-aged children in the future? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of
the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita.
Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, how was participation and eligibility reported by
parish/city public school districts? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of
the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita.

Enabling

Predisposing

Enabling

Enabling

Enabling

Enabling

Reinforcing

Enabling
(Table 5, con’t)
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18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Were Louisiana NSLP employees relocated to other parishes after Hurricane Katrina to
help relieve schools that were short-staffed? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative
assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Was personnel shifted between parishes after Hurricane Rita? Objective #1: Obtain an
administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the
wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
How did school foodservice and administration handle instances where employees could
not be located? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and
circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
What are some examples of how some schools’ foodservice handled infrastructure
challenges? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and
circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
What effects did the hurricanes have on Louisiana’s NSLP food access and inventory?
Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the
NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Were there costs associated with NSLP personnel and infrastructure changes, shifts in
student enrollment, or the actual physical loss of food? Objective #1: Obtain an
administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the
wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
How was the Red Cross able to assist Louisiana with the delivery of school food service
after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of
the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita.
Which and to what capacity were other civic organizations able to assist the NSLP in
Louisiana after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative
assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Enabling

Enabling

Enabling

Reinforcing

Enabling

Enabling

Enabling

Enabling
(Table 5, con’t)
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26

27

28

29
30

If so, did this contribute to the Louisiana Department of Education’s ability to meet the
needs of the National School Lunch Program? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative
assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
What steps did the state administrators take to let evacuated students and families know
that they were automatically eligible for free lunches? How was the state effort different
from the local and national efforts? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of
the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita.
Do you have any suggestions for future NSLP disaster policy in Louisiana or in the United
States? Objective #5: Relay suggestions from the NSLP and FSP administrators’
interviews for future NSLP and FSP disaster policies and procedures.
Are there any other additional comments that you would like to add with regard to the
National School Lunch Program in Louisiana following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita?
Do you have any recommendations for others with whom I should interview?
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Reinforcing

Enabling

n/a
n/a
n/a

Unique characteristics that define the participating NSLP SFA (Archdiocese of New
Orleans, Breaux Bridge, Cameron, East Baton Rouge Parish, Lafayette Archdiocese, St. Charles,
St. James, and Tangipahoa) and FSP (Orleans, Thibodaux, and Lake Charles) regions were
reported. For example, shifts in enrollment or damage reports were included in this summary.
Enrollment summaries are characterized by parish and by public school only, not the SFA.
Consequently, shifts in enrollment from the Archdiocese of New Orleans and the Lafayette
diocese could not be tracked.
Food Stamp Program
Participants
A similar selection process was conducted for the FSP. Local and state administrators
from Louisiana’s were recruited and asked to participate in an interview. Prior to each interview,
an information sheet was provided and a consent from was signed by the interviewer and
participant. Each interview was conducted privately with only the interviewer and participant
present. Potential participants were listed based on the job titles, area of jurisdiction, which
hurricane affected the region, and possible changes in enrollment (Table 6).
Permission for 7 interviews was granted by the Executive Director of Family Assistance
Program Policy and Field Operations Division. The first FSP interview was conducted on March
14, 2006, with the Southwest Region Sections Chief. The Regional Manager from Covington
Region III declined participation in the study.
Interview Design
The FSP interview questions (Appendix G) were designed to use the information from
the implementation of disaster policy in order to evaluate the factors with which predisposed,
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Table 6: FSP administrators chosen based on area of jurisdiction, which hurricane affected
region, and changes in enrollment
Hurricane
Change in Enrollment
Interviewee Title
Area of Jurisdiction
Perspective
Section Chief, Food
Southwest Region,
Stamp Program
FNS: Arkansas,
Integrity and Nutrition
Louisiana, New
n/a
n/a
Section
Mexico, Oklahoma,
Texas
Family Assistance
Hurricanes Katrina
Program Policy Section
State
n/a
and Rita
Manager
Food Stamp Nutrition
Hurricanes Katrina
Education Program
State
n/a
and Rita
Director
Electronic Benefits
Hurricanes Katrina
Transfer Section
State
n/a
and Rita
Manager
Regional Manager
Orleans Region I
Hurricane Katrina
Decrease
Regional Manager
Hurricane Katrina
Thibodaux Region IV
Increase
and Rita
Regional Manager
Lake Charles Region
Hurricane Rita
Increase
VI

enabled, hindered or reinforced the system administration during the wake of Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita. Semi-structured, open-ended questions were designed based in part on topics (program
policy, budget, reporting, and administration) and then guided by step 7 in the
PRECEDE/PROCEED model. Step 7 from the PRECEED/PROCEED model was isolated in
this study to identify the factors (predisposing, enabling/barriers, and reinforcing) that are
required to initiate change (67). Table 6 lists paraphrased versions of the NSLP questions,
matched objective and the identifying factor. Table 7 lists paraphrased versions of the FSP
questions, the matched objective, and the identifying factor.
The interview questions were grouped according to the identifying factors. The factors
include:
1. Policy (P)
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2. Budget (B)
3. Reporting (R)
4. Program administration (PA)
5. Suggestions for future disaster planning. (FDP)
The final FSP survey consisted of 32 questions (P=7, B=5, R=1, PA=16, FDP=1).
Information that the participant wanted to include, but that was not covered in the interview was
covered in Question #31. Question #32 asked the interviewee to make recommendations for
others to interview.
Interview Discussions
Prior to the interview, an electronic version of the respective interview was e-mailed to
the participant. An appointment was scheduled either by e-mail or by phone call. At the
beginning of each interview, the participant was given an information sheet to read and discuss
before signing a consent form (Appendix H). A copy of the information sheet which included
contact information was provided to the participant for their records. Participants were then
interviewed. Two recording, digital and analog, devices were used in each of the interviews,
except for the interviews conducted the Regional Managers from the Lake Charles and New
Orleans Regions, who both requested that their interviews not be recorded. Detailed field notes
were taken during all of the interviews.
Analysis
Following the interviews, the digital tapes were transcribed verbatim. Analog tapes were
compared to the digital tapes and field notes for clarity. Each of the responses from each of the
questions were grouped by question and identifying factor and then compared. Frequency of
responses and themes were identified. Interviewees’ responses to questions were also classified
as predisposing, enabling, or reinforcing factors to the successful execution of the NSLP and FSP
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after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and sorted in a table. Unique characteristics that define the
participating NSLP SFA (Archdiocese of New Orleans, Breaux Bridge, Cameron, East Baton
Rouge Parish, Lafayette Archdiocese, St. Charles, St. James, and Tangipahoa) and FSP (Orleans,
Thibodaux, and Lake Charles) regions were reported. For example, shifts in enrollment or
damage reports were included in this summary.
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Table 7: FSP Interview Questions by number, type, phase in emergency management response and factor identified
#
Paraphrased Question and Matched Objective
Identified Factor
1
What emergency/disaster preparations did the DSS have in place prior to Hurricanes
Katrina? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and
Predisposing
circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
2
Objective #2: Determine the successful reinforcing, predisposing and enabling factors
associated with program policy, budget, reporting, and administration delivery following
Enabling
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
3
What barriers did the DSS face while trying to implement the DFSP plan after Hurricane
Enabling
Katrina? Objective #3: Find the barriers faced while trying to implement the programs
and how they led to changes in policy, budget, reporting, and administration.
4
Did these barriers lead to changes in policy prior to Hurricane Rita? Objective #3: Find
the barriers faced while trying to implement the programs and how they led to changes in
Enabling
policy, budget, reporting, and administration.
5
Were these changes (#4) temporary or permanent? Objective #1: Obtain an
administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the
Enabling
wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
6
Did the arrival of Hurricane Rita compound or reinforce any changes to Louisiana’s
Enabling
DFSP? Objective #3: Find the barriers faced while trying to implement the programs and
how they led to changes in policy, budget, reporting, and administration.
7
What enabled the success of Louisiana’s DFSP after Hurricane Rita? Objective #2:
Determine the successful reinforcing, predisposing and enabling factors associated with
Enabling
program policy, budget, reporting, and administration delivery following Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita.
8
What barriers did the Louisiana DSS face while trying to implement the DFSP plan after
Enabling
Hurricane Rita? Objective #3: Find the barriers faced while trying to implement the
programs and how they led to changes in policy, budget, reporting, and administration
(Table 6, con’t)
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9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

Did these post-Hurricane Rita barriers lead to changes in disaster policy? Objective #1:
Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and
FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
If so, were these changes temporary or permanent? Objective #1: Obtain an
administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the
wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Did Louisiana adapt the national Disaster Food Stamp Program (DFSP) application or
use a state-specific application? If Louisiana used a state-specific application, how was
the DFSP application adapted for Louisiana? Hurricane Katrina? Hurricane Rita?
Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of
the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Were adaptations to the DFSP application dependent on the nature or degree of the
disaster? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and
circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Will any of these changes permanently affect the eligibility or disaster policy? Objective
#1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP
and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
With regard to the DFSP, did Hurricane Katrina require the LA DSS re-budget federal
and state funds among parishes? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of
the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita.
If so, how did the revised budget change with the arrival of Hurricane Rita on September
24, 2005? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and
circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
How did the re-budgeting affect Louisiana’s ability to offer non-Disaster Food Stamps in
the 2006 fiscal year and in the near future while rebuilding of Louisiana’s Gulf Coast?
Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of
the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Enabling

Enabling

Enabling

Enabling

Enabling

Enabling

Enabling

Enabling
(Table 6, con’t)
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17

18

19

20

21

22

23

How will changes in the policy and budget after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita affect
future national, state, or regional disaster policy? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative
assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
How will the changes in the policy and budget effect Louisiana’s ability to provide
nutrition assistance during the next emergency? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative
assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, how was participation and eligibility reported by
cities? Parishes? State? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies
and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
What steps did the state administrators take to let evacuated families know that they were
automatically eligible for the DFSP? How was the state effort different from the local
and national efforts? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies
and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Were Louisiana DSS employees relocated or reassigned to other parishes after Hurricane
Katrina to help relieve increased administration burden? Objective #1: Obtain an
administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the
wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Were temporary application/issuance sites coordinated in any parishes in Louisiana in
order to increase access to the DFSP? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment
of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita.
If so, where in Louisiana were the temporary application/issuance sites set up? Objective
#1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP
and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Enabling

Enabling

Enabling

Enabling

Enabling

Enabling

Enabling
(Table 6, con’t)
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24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31
32

How did Louisiana’s DSS handle instances where OFS Family Assistance employees
could not be located? For example:
Did new personnel have to be temporarily assigned or hired?
Were out-of-state or in-state volunteers recruited to assist? Objective #1: Obtain an
administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the
wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
How were food stamps issued to Louisiana residents affected by Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita when Social Security cards, verification of identity, proof of residence, and income
information were not available? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the
policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita.
What are some examples of how DSS handled infrastructure damage? Objective #1:
Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and
FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Facing the same infrastructure damage, how were EBT cards acquired and physically
distributed? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and
circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
What fraud prevention efforts did the DSS administer after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita?
Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of
the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
How did the federal staff of the Disaster Response Assistance Team (DART) assist
Louisiana’s DFSP? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies
and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Do you have any suggestions for future DFSP policy in Louisiana or the United States?
Objective #5: Relay suggestions from the NSLP and FSP administrators’ interviews for
future NSLP and FSP disaster policies and procedures.
Are there any additional comments that you would like to add that you feel are important
to include with regard to the DFSP in Louisiana following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita?
Do you have any recommendations for others with whom I should interview?
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Enabling

Enabling

Enabling

Enabling

Enabling

Enabling

n/a
n/a
n/a

CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
A total of 17 interviews were conducted (NSLP=10, FSP=7) with administrators from the
NSLP and the FSP. Characteristics of the NSLP interviews are shown in Tables 8.
Table 8: Ten NSLP interviews conducted with title of participant, date of interview, location of
interview, and length of interview
Length
Interviewee Title
Location
Date
(hour:min:sec)
Director of Food Services, Department of
Louisiana Department of
Education, state
March 8, 2006
1:06:22
Education, Division of
office, Baton Rouge
Nutrition Assistance
Cameron Parish SFA
Cameron Parish
April 8, 2006
1:02:42
Supervisor
SFA Office
Lafayette Diocese SFA
Lafayette Diocese
April 10, 2006
42:12
Supervisor
SFA Office
St. Martin Parish SFA
St. Martin Parish
April 10, 2006
58:37
Supervisor
SFA Office
Director of School Food
New Orleans
and Nutrition Services of
Diocese SFA
New Orleans
Office
July 6, 2006
47:14
(Archdiocese of New
Orleans)
Director of Food
Department of
Distribution Division
Agriculture and
July 7, 2006
32:05
Forestry Office
East Baton Rouge Parish
East Baton Rouge
August 8, 2006
1:27:31
SFA Assistant Director
Parish SFA Office
St. Charles Parish SFA
Local Café in
August 18, 2006
57:24
Director
Lulling, LA
St. James Parish SFA
St. James Parish
27:27
Supervisor
SFA Office
August 23, 2006
(Plus additional
non-taped time)
Tangipahoa Parish SFA
Tangipahoa SFA
August 24, 2006
25:51
Director
Office

National School Lunch Program
Successes during Implementation
Most of the successes or enablers identified by the SFA supervisors resulted from
waivers released by the USDA (Appendix H) and the dedication of the employees and
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volunteers. The USDA waivers were issued from a federal level and disseminated to the SFA
through the state office. The waivers that were most often mentioned as the most helpful during
implementation of the NSLP during the storms were those regarding eligibility, reporting, meal
pattern, and verification requirements. A summary of enabling factors is shown in Table 9.
Table 9: Summary of enabling factors by SFA reported by NSLP administrators
SFA
Enabling Factors
Hurricane
Director of School Food
USDA waivers, Dedication of
Both
Services (state office)
employees
Food Distribution Division Dedication of SFA
Both
Cameron Parish SFA
USDA waivers, Dedication
Rita
St. Charles Parish SFA
USDA waivers, Dedication
Both
Archdiocese of New
USDA waivers, Dedication
Katrina
Orleans SFA
Tangipahoa Parish SFA
USDA waivers, National Guard
Katrina
St. James Parish SFA
USDA waivers, Dedication
Katrina
St. Martin Parish SFA
USDA waivers, Dedication
Both
Lafayette diocese SFA
USDA waivers, Dedication
Both
East Baton Rouge Parish
USDA waivers, Dedication
Both
SFA

Eligibility. The waiver released by the USDA on August 31, 2005, and extended on
September 26, 2005, changed the eligibility requirements for the NSLP allowing an increased
number of students to receive free lunch. As stated in the waiver described in Appendix I,
children who came from families participating in emergency food stamps or who were displaced
(and therefore considered homeless) from either of the storms were eligible for free lunch. This
meant that reimbursement from the USDA was increased regardless of the schools’ pre-storm
enrollment.
The Director of School Food Services said that “we could not have done it without
USDA saying just feed the children.” This was also the principal enabling factor for the
Cameron Parish SFA. After Hurricane Rita, the Cameron Parish schools opened on October 31,
2005, at that time waivers had declared all displaced families homeless. The SFA supervisor
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was prepared to report 100% homeless status. This not only minimized the time that would
otherwise be spent on reporting and verification, but reimbursement increased. The SFA
Director of St. James parish added to by saying, “we are a parish more affluent than most in
Louisiana. We’re only 47-48% free and reduced, [the homeless waiver] meant we got more free
students and so our reimbursement was higher.”
The Director of the New Orleans diocese SFA added a different perspective to how this
waiver affected the students. The director suggested that the students would move around the
district and that they “had been through enough.” The waiver allowed them “to be able to come
into the cafeteria and we could just say, ‘Welcome, sweetie, here’s your lunch.”
Allowing all children to eat free “simplified” things for the SFA Director of the
Tangipahoa Parish. The Lafayette diocese SFA Director added that the administration
anticipated that some families would leave without paying tuition, but allowing the claim free
lunches for all of the students that relocated helped the budget. East Baton Rouge Parish opened
up an additional two schools to accommodate the influx of students displaced by the hurricanes.
The director said, “Accountability was a nightmare. And the state gave us the okay to count
these students as free for three months. So this saved us a tremendous amount of time.”
Reporting. The waiver released by the USDA on September 7, 2005, stated that
Louisiana had the option to extend the deadline (inventory and NSLP participation) for reporting
to December 31, 2005, or waive it entirely. However, on September 22, 2005, the USDA
released another waiver stating that the deadline for the required reports was extended further.
October 2005, claims could be submitted on or before January 31, 2006. November 2005,
claims could be submitted on or before February 31, 2006.
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The waiver also adjusted the required paperwork while reporting participation. The
schools were allowed to list free and reduced lunch eligibility. During this time, individual
applications were not required for the student to receive benefits.
After Hurricane Rita, the Cameron Parish SFA Supervisor was faced with challenges in
her reporting system. Four of the schools in Cameron Parish were completed destroyed and all
of the students that remained in the parish attended two school sites with an extended day
schedule. It was requested that all original six schools continue to maintain separate reporting.
Thus, students eligible for free or reduced lunches as well as the food bought and served to them
would be reported as if they were still attending their schools. The supervisor added that keeping
the students separate wasn’t a huge problem, but that there “was no way” she could have kept a
separate inventory. The supervisor asked and was permitted by the state to report inventory on
the two open schools (Hackberry and Johnson Bayou) only.
Meal Pattern. The waiver released by the USDA on August 31, 2005, and extended after
the arrival of Hurricane Rita on September 26, 2005, stated that meal pattern flexibility was
allowed. Schools may be exempt from milk and other meal component requirements. This
meant that the schools could serve the foods that they were able to receive from their vendors
without concern for reimbursement by USDA.
The Director of School Food Services said that this enabled the success of the program
after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita because “we couldn’t get food.” The director added that the
districts were “scrambling” and that they needed the flexibility that the USDA allowed so that
they “could just feed the children.” The Cameron Parish SFA Supervisor agreed that this was a
factor in her ability to feed the students in her parish. The Archdiocese of New Orleans SFA
Director added that the meal pattern flexibility was “critical” because of the “mass transition”
coupled with the “lack of labor.” This was a substantial time saver and stress reducer since she
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“didn’t have to worry about putting their names in the computer, getting the piece of paper, and
tracking all of that.”
Although the milk component of the meal pattern was waived, finding milk to serve
students was a difficult for some parishes. The St. James Parish SFA Supervisor and the St.
Charles Parish SFA Director said that because their milk vendors were in New Orleans and
dairies were not operating, finding milk to serve was a challenge. The St. Charles Parish SFA
Director added that because it was not required to have milk that the director “was very
fortunate.”
Some parishes pooled resources to increase variety of available food. The Lafayette
diocese SFA Director said that sharing food and support “helped a lot.” She and the St. Martin
SFA Director network in a self-organized consortium of Louisiana SFA Directors in southwest
LA. The group includes: Acadia, Beauregard, Jefferson Davis, Evangeline, St. Landry diocese,
Vermillion Parish, Calcasieu, Cameron, Iberia, St. Martin, and Lafayette Parishes. After the
storms, the group convened to “brainstorm.” At that time, they shared “commodities, flour, or
do a transfer.” The Lafayette diocese SFA had a food warehouse, so the group ordered
truckloads of one product for a better price and stored it in the Lafayette diocese warehouse until
it could be picked up by the other SFA. She noted that “a truckload of French fries is much better
priced than trying to by it by the case.”
Many parishes were still able to serve a reimbursable meal. St. James Parish, the New
Orleans diocese, and St. Charles Parish all said that with the exception of milk, most if not all of
their meals that they served would have been otherwise reimbursable by USDA.
Verification. The USDA released a waiver on September 7, 2005, that eliminated the
verification requirement for schools affected by Hurricane Katrina. This was later extended for
Hurricane Rita on September 26, 2005. Instead of requiring a paycheck stub and verifying the
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social security number of the parents, the information on the application was trusted as accurate.
The East Baton Rouge Parish SFA Director noted that this was “a huge timesaver. We were so
busy getting free lunch applications in and trying to establish rosters of children who were being
enrolled. It was good a thing that happened.”
Dedication of Staff and Community. All of the SFA Directors and Supervisors that
were interviewed mentioned that the dedication and commitment of their staff and independent
volunteers or civic organizations were an enabling factor in the success of the implementation of
the NSLP after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The Director of the Food Distribution Division
noted that “the school lunch and the state are staffed with very forceful and resilient ladies.
There is nothing that they can’t tackle, or won’t.”
When asked what enabled the success of the NSLP after Hurricane Rita, she said, “the
dedication of employees was number one.” She then added that employees had lost their
“houses and everything, and showed up to work to give everything. The stuff that they did,
Emily. They went into horribly disgusting, nasty, rank, walk-in cooler freezers with food. They
cleaned out kitchens and just did everything.” She added that these employees were paid the
same amount as displaced employees who weren’t currently working for the New Orleans
diocese.
The Director of the School Food Service expressed pride in the SFA leadership and
added that they did “whatever they could.” Cameron Parish’s SFA Supervisor returned with her
family to the parish before electricity had been restored or she could contact employees.
Together, she and her family began opening and cleaning the coolers.
Civic organizations seemed to have been a successful consideration during the
implementation of the NSLP during the storms. Donations to the Cameron Parish SFA after
Hurricane Rita were made through civic organizations, churches, and privately. She added that
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they came from “all over the nation.” The donated food and money was able to provide snacks
to the students who attended an extended day school schedule. America’s Second Harvest
donated two truckloads of food to the East Baton Rouge Parish SFA.
The National Guard assisted the Director of the New Orleans diocese SFA Director clean
out and remove cooler freezers. They were also helpful to the Tangipahoa Parish SFA. The
Director noted that “they were very helpful in helping us to distribute the food.” The schools’
food was used to “serve hospital patients and everything. We helped [the community].”
The St. Charles Parish SFA was able to assist the community also. The SFA donated
supplies to the St. Charles fire department. They were unable to purchase items “like paper
plates. So anything that they needed, we gave to them.”
Barriers during Implementation
The most often identified barriers that administrators faced during implementation of the
NSLP during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were pre-storm preparedness/experience,
communication, infrastructure damage, budget constrictions, and food loss or availability. A
summary of the barriers reported is shown in Table 10.
Pre-storm Preparedness. Several of the SFA’s interviewed mentioned that there was
little hurricane preparedness prior to the storms. The SFA from the New Orleans diocese said
that “things [were] in place more for bio-terrorism.” She called it a “limited plan.” The SFA from
St. James Parish noted that the only disaster planning was “whatever guidelines are required in
1196.1”

1

Title 28, Part XLIX of Bulletin1196 is a board approved manual of the policies of operation for the food and
nutrition programs in Louisiana schools.
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Table 10: Summary of barriers factors by SFA reported by NSLP administrators
SFA
Barriers
Hurricane
Director of School Food
Communication, Increased
Both
Services (state office)
student enrollment
Food Distribution Division Trucks and transportation
Both
Infrastructure damage,
Cameron Parish SFA
communication, storage, food
Rita
accessibility, budget
Communication, Employees,
St. Charles Parish SFA
Both
Food and milk availability
Food accessibility, garbage
Archdiocese of New
pick-up, labor, communication,
Katrina
Orleans SFA
employees, vendors, budget
Tangipahoa Parish SFA
Loss of food, food accessibility
Katrina
Availability of milk,
St. James Parish SFA
Katrina
communication, vendors
St. Martin Parish SFA
Influx of students
Both
Food availability,
Lafayette diocese SFA
Both
communication
Influx of students,
East Baton Rouge Parish
communication, employees were
Both
SFA
unavailable, budget

When asked what parts of Bulletin 1196 were left to the parish, district or school, the
director of the New Orleans diocese said, “I would say 100% of it had to do at the district level,
‘cause we are the ones who establishes that policy and implemented it at the school. The schools
had to take the initial action and there was no communication.”
The St. Charles SFA said that the parish had evacuation instructions for the students and
the employees; however, few logistics were planned as staff and families expected to return
home and to work. The interview with the SFA Director from Tangipahoa added that the main
pre-disaster planning the parish did was “mainly with commodities.” Both the Director of the
Food Distribution Division and the State Office emphasized that the relationship with the Red
Cross was the major preparedness activity prior to Hurricane Katrina. The Director of the SFA
in St. James Parish added that “it was a wake-up call.”
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Communication. Another major barrier to the implementation of the NSLP after the
storms was the inability to communicate through telephone, cellular service, e-mail, or fax. The
SFA of the Archdiocese of New Orleans described the first attempts at text messages through the
cell phones after Hurricane Katrina. Contacting employees was a major challenge. SFA
Directors and supervisors needed to know if the staff was safe, where they were, and when they
could return to schools once they opened.
A SFA supervisor noted that she had difficulties contacting the state office for
information. The New Orleans diocese moved her office to the Baton Rouge diocese with the
archbishop. The director “had to…call them personally” and added that it was “me calling
them.”
The Director of School Food Services noted that “it wasn’t so much anyone’s fault. It
was just that we couldn’t get through to people via phones tied up, always busy, their email
bouncing back.” The director added that for a short period of time she had to rely on “people
getting in touch with us somehow someway before we could help.” The Director of School Food
Services added that the DNA set up “five systems that if they had any questions, needed
anything, whatever, they had his number, his e-mail, his cell phone. He was the contact point for
anything.”
Communication with food and milk vendors was difficult. While trying to contract with a
vendor with refrigerated trucks, the St. Charles she “waited in line in a FedEx and faxed him this
hand written contract that I made up. It probably took 17 times just to get through.” The SFA
supervisor from the Archdiocese of New Orleans noted that “communication with employees
and vendors was one of the largest challenges.” The St. Charles SFA supervisor added that
because she had a 225 (Baton Rouge metro area code) area code she was able to contact vendors
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faster than if she was located in a 504 (New Orleans metro area code). This also allowed her to
purchased food with other available food contractors.
Food Losses and Availability. Buying food to serve to the students in the schools was a
problem for nearly all of the parishes. During the interview with the Director of School Food
Services, she said that “they [the schools] did definitely have a loss of food. They had higher
enrollments and commodities were depleted. The demand for food was high. It was just all over
the board.” Referring to moving commodities to the affected parishes and schools, the Director
of the Food Distribution Division for Louisiana said, “transportation was difficult to come by
anywhere in the country.” The director added, “…if you could drive by [Target ®] and there
must have been 200 or 300 18-wheelers just sitting there. And those trucks weren’t able to haul
anything that we needed or a lot of other people, you know. FEMA was a big suckin’ family.
They sucked up every bit of asset that was around. It’s hard to get stuff in and that was
frustrating.”
The Cameron Parish SFA supervisor said that getting groceries and supplies was a major
challenge in preparing to restart food services to students. She added once she was able to find a
supplier who could provide food, storage became a problem. “We had 18-wheelers show up at
our door and say, ‘okay, we’ve got a fresh truck full of food. Now where do you want it?’ So we
unloaded a lot into our gyms, just for temporary storage.” She included that while we did have a
cooler truck and a freezer truck, she needed additional food storage.
The availability of food for St. Charles Parish was a problem and school food service
became the only source of food for some families. “The biggest problem was not in the schools.
The biggest problem was there was no food in the stores and not stores open for families to eat,
and so they relied heavily on the schools to prepare meals for their kids.”
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Challenges were similar for the Lafayette diocese SFA. “Getting sugar, meat- chicken”
was difficult since the sugar mills in New Orleans were down. She added that as a result, “some
prices did go up. The diocese lost several thousand dollars of food.”
The New Orleans diocese SFA supervisor said that “food deliveries were an issue, just
trying to get anything delivered.” They lost their entire inventory. She added that the problem
was compounded because, “vendors lost food; they lost trucks, they lost employees. So they had
challenges delivering items to us. We had to work with other distributors during the emergency
situation.” New Orleans diocese lost about $270,000 in purchased foods and $93,000 in
commodity foods. There was a $5 million dollar lost in equipment. One million dollars was
allocated for equipment purchase during the 2006 summer.
Tangipahoa Parish lost about $300,000 worth of food, which was “our frozen food
inventory.” Loss of food in the St. Martin Parish SFA was limited to one case of milk, they were
required to make an emergency purchase “from the Lafayette vendor to get [food] so we could
operate the rest of September [2005].” She added that “FEMA told me since commodities were
purchase with federal funds, we couldn’t claim the use of commodities.” The purchase was
“significant.” When probed for a dollar amount, she added that in was “five digits. Anything
over three in food service is a lot.” A summary of losses in located in Appendix I.
Infrastructure Damage. Some parishes included in the study were more devastated
physically than others. For example, the New Orleans Archdiocese and Cameron Parish were
the most adversely affected from the physical impacts of the hurricanes.
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the New Orleans diocese provided lunches in 110 sites. This
included “89 cooking schools.” When the 2005-2006 school year ended, the New Orleans
diocese was operating in 77 sites. A majority of the lost sites were satellite schools, which were
described as, “small schools that didn’t have kitchens. And we cooked for them and had the food
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sent over.” The number of satellite kitchens decreased from 21 prior to Katrina to 13 after the
storm. Schools with full kitchens dropped from 89, prior to Hurricane Katrina to 69 operating
kitchens. The director noted that “we’re down 20 cooking schools.”
At the time of the interview, new kitchens for Mount Carmel and Our Lady of Lourdes in
Slidell, LA were going to be gutted and refurbished. Mount Carmel “had water to the rooftop.”
The school reopened in December 2005, but operated without a lunch program. Our Lady of
Lourdes was “wiped off the map completely.” Plans for a kitchen to be built in a trailer were
underway. The Archdiocese of New Orleans SFA Director added, “You have priorities in
school. And it’s number one, educate the kids, and then we’ll feed the students.” The director
noted that pre-Katrina, “we were doing about 36,000 lunches a day. Post-Katrina in September
we dropped to a low of 9,000 a day.”
When asked about how the staff and schools handled challenges with infrastructure
damage, she provided two examples. “Two schools in St. Tammany, Margaret Mary, [which]
used to serve last year, ’04-’05, served 550 lunches. And down the street was Our Lady of the
Lourdes in Slidell, two elementary schools, and they served about 320 lunches. Our Lady of the
Lourdes was destroyed, completely. So all of the children went to Margaret Mary. This was a
school that was built for 500-600 and now they had 800-900 kids. The two kitchen staff now
had to move into one kitchen. So you had more people than you were used to in a small kitchen.
And the school food service delivered the meal to every single student in the classroom. Could
not serve anyone in the cafeteria because the cafeteria was being used by students for classes and
things like that because there were so many kids.”
The Archdiocese of New Orleans SFA Director provided another example. Because
trucks could not access certain parts of the city, “in certain areas, we had to…vendors get a drop.
They would go to one school and do a drop for three or four or five schools, and our employees
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had to go get the food and haul it back to their school. The vendors only had one driver and they
just gave us what they could.”
Cameron Parish faced an influx of students after Hurricane Katrina, but most of its
infrastructure damage occurred during Hurricane Rita. Geographically, Cameron Parish is the
largest parish in Louisiana, but one of the most scarcely populated. Prior to Hurricane Rita, there
were six schools in operation. They included Grand Lakes, Hackberry, Johnson Bayou,
Cameron Elementary, South Cameron Elementary, and South Cameron High School. Following
Hurricane Rita, the four schools were completely destroyed, leaving only Hackberry and Johnson
Bayou to serve the students and families in Cameron Parish (Figures 1-2). Prior to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, the total student enrollment for the parish was 1910. After Hurricane Rita,
student enrollment decreased by 55% to 1042 (free lunch = 671, reduced lunch = 236, total =
907). At the time of the interview, student enrollment was 1510 (free lunch = 1504, reduced = 2,
full price = 4).
Prior to the start of the interview, the Cameron Parish SFA Supervisor presented a power
point slide show that included photographs of the schools and the devastation after Hurricane
Rita (Figures 5-6). During an explanation of the image in one of the photographs, she noted that
“I had no way of contacting any of my managers, because all of their homes no longer existed
and cell phone towers were out. I ended up having to get my family to come back with me just to
take all of the food out of the coolers and freezers of the two schools that remained.” She added
that at the time of the interview she had “not found any signs of that walk-in cooler. It got a
forty-foot tidal surge through it.”
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Figure 5: Photo of the South Cameron Elementary School after
Hurricane Rita. (Courtesy of Cynthia Carpenter)

Figure6: Photo of the kitchen at Cameron Elementary in
Cameron Parish after Hurricane Rita (Courtesy of Cynthia
Carpenter)

The Cameron Parish SFA Supervisor continued, “The biggest problem we had after the
storm, and getting going again, we had to have a sanitation review on Grand Lake and Hackberry
in order to reopen.” The review was scheduled on October 26, 2005 and the school was
scheduled to reopen on October 31, 2005. Food deliveries were contingent upon approval from
the sanitation review.
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When asked about how the parish handled instances where physical damage prevented
normal operation, the supervisor described the food service at the two operating schools. “They
have longer days. They go ‘til 5. 7:30 [in the morning] until 5, to make up time. They are going
through 2½ days each of food. I just don’t have adequate storage for that much [food].” She
added that because of the extended days, all meals weren’t reimbursable. A waiver was
submitted, but wasn’t approved by the USDA. Fortunately, “the nation brought food. Churches
were bringing supplies.” The donated food was used for snacks served later in the day.
Budget. When asked about how re-budgeting will affect Louisiana’s ability to offer free
and reduced lunch, most SFA supervisors and directors responded that they would still be able to
provide the service, but that budgets were profoundly affected. Most of the parishes maintained
staff schedules and kept and paid all managers while schools were closed. Although income was
down and kitchens were unable to facilitate all of the staff, salaries were maintained and hours
were often increased. The Director of the Lafayette diocese SFA noted that she “paid out more
money because we were adding hours to our staff, but it was needed.”
The Director of the New Orleans diocese SFA said that her district “receives no local
funds. So [we were] running a budget in extremely tight.” She added that after Katrina there
were a lot of expenses, but at the time of the interview no federal or state funds had been
allocated to replace any of the lost food or equipment. While facing massive budget restrictions,
wages were increased due to the wages that FEMA were paying. “We’ve had to increase wages
because fast food restaurants are offering [higher wages] and the FEMA is paying a very high
rate for employees. So it’s actually made our job harder to find employees. And that has been
true for some of our vendors. A lot of people have quit their jobs after 12 years to work for
FEMA.”
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The Assistant Director of the East Baton Rouge Parish SFA explained the competition
between employees commuting to New Orleans to work at “Wendy’s for $10.00 or go to work in
EBR and make $6.00 an hour as a day-by-day.” She added that there were 30 vacancies for food
service employees. At the time of the interview, those vacancies were staffed by day-by-day
employees.
Changes in Enrollment
Although the USDA relaxed the enrollment reporting requirements for the NSLP after the
storms, students receiving free and reduced lunches were documented and published. Their
system had the ability to track the meal status of the students in each parish in the state. In
addition, they were able to track and report students who attending a different school because
they were displaced from the storms.
The Archdiocese of New Orleans and the Lafayette diocese were not tracked for
enrollment changes. Data regarding the detail the enrollment in the participating parishes and
districts before and after the storms is in Appendix I.
Participants’ Suggestions for Future Disaster Policy
The responses by the interviewees when asked about future disaster policy, many of the
barriers were addressed. Topics that were most often mentioned were USDA response and
communication. All of the SFA and the Director of School Food Services said that the waivers
should be replicated for future disasters. Since the storms, some SFA have purchase two-way
radios and have formatted emergency contact documents. Moreover, due to current limits in
technology, there is little that they SFA thought that could be done about this problem.
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Food Stamp Program
Interviews were conducted with 7 regional, state, and local administrators from the FSP.
The characteristics of the interviews are shown in Table 11.
Table 11: Seven FSP interviews conducted with title of participant, date, location, and length of
interview
Length
Interviewee Title
Location
Date
(hour:min:sec)
Section Chief, Food
Southern University
March 14, 2006
33:18
Stamp Program
Baton Rouge, LA
Integrity and Nutrition
Section
Family Assistance
LA state office,
July 18, 2006
59:01
Program Policy Section
Baton Rouge, LA
Manager
Food Stamp Nutrition
LA state office, LSU
August 16, 2006
43:01
Education Program
AgCenter, Baton
Director
Rouge, LA
Electronic Benefits
LA state office,
August 22, 2006
52:17
Transfer Section
Baton Rouge, LA
Manager
Regional Manager
Orleans Region I
August 30, 2006
(not taped)2
Metairie, LA
Regional Manager
Lake Charles Region
August 29, 2006
(not taped) 3
VI, Lake Charles, LA
Regional
Thibodaux Region
August 31, 2006
1:05:48
Manager
IV, Thibodaux, LA

Successes during Implementation
The enabling factors identified by the interviewed FSP administrators were the
attributed to the dedication of the community and staff, and waivers issued by the USDA.
The USDA waivers were issued from a federal level and disseminated to the state office.
The waivers that were mentioned as the most helpful during implementation of the FSP
during the storms were those regarding eligibility, benefits, and verification requirements.
A summary of enabling factors are shown in Table 12.
2
3

Not taped at the request of the participant
Not taped at the request of the participant
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Table 12: Summary of enabling factors during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita as reported by
FSP administrators
SFA
Enabling Factors
USDA Regional Manager
USDA Waivers, Dedication
Policy Sections Manager
USDA Waivers
EBT Sections Manager
USDA Waivers, Dedication
Director of Nutrition Education
Dedication of staff
Lake Charles Regional Manager
USDA Waivers, Dedication of staff and
Community, Out-of-state volunteers
New Orleans Regional Manager
USDA Waivers, Dedication of staff and
Community, Out-of-state volunteers
Thibodaux Regional Manager
USDA Waivers, Dedication of staff and
Community, Out-of-state volunteers

USDA Waivers. After the arrival of Hurricane Katrina, the USDA released a waiver on
September 2, 2005, that initiated the FNS’ disaster FSP. The Sections Manager described a
disaster food stamp program as a series of waiver requests to operate a program. The waivers
released by the USDA after Hurricane Katrina are summarized in Appendix I. There was not an
evacuee policy for Hurricane Rita. Waivers from Hurricane Katrina were extended to include
those affected by Hurricane Rita.
The FNS Regional Manager attributed the success of the implementing the Disaster FSP
after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to the immediate response of the USDA. She said, “We came
out with a National Evacuee Policy and that was to aid evacuees everywhere, not just in
Louisiana. It was a huge caseload on any state that had a large amount of evacuees.” The EBT
Manager attributed success of the program to the waiver that allowed evacuees to apply and
receive benefits in any parish. The Sections Manager agreed and said that this was the number
one factor in enabling the success of the program after the storms. The New Orleans and Lake
Charles Regional Managers agreed. The Sections Manager added that it all of the parishes that
requested disaster status were approved.
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Staff and Community Dedication. The USDA Regional Manager reported that staff
from the regional office in Dallas who worked over the weekend and all week after Hurricane
Katrina. She added that “we were working seven days a week, not quite 24 hours a day.” The
Thibodaux Regional Manager explained that disaster program was originally approved for one
week only. During this time her office went to a 24-hour operation. Her staff was divided into
2- 12 hour shifts. She said that the staff was exhausted, but the applicant demand was there.
When asked how long the 24-hour operation ran, she said, “I just don’t remember. It’s sort of all
blurred together.”
The director added later in the interview that after Hurricane Katrina, 100% of her staff
was dedicated to serving the needs of those applying for disaster relief. The Director of Nutrition
Education said that her agents turned their attention from Nutrition Education to food security
and food access. The director added that the staff “manned desks, did applications, processed
applications, were caseworkers. We literally joined in the ranks of the food stamp offices
because they were completely inundated and swamped with people.”
In addition to dedication from the FNS employees working in their pre-Hurricane Katrina
office, many employees went to work at offices in areas where they had evacuated. The USDA
Regional Manager noted that many Louisiana DSS employees who were displaced from New
Orleans would “show up at one of the office and say ‘I’m here to work if you need me.’” She
wasn’t sure if it was mandatory. The EBT Manager noted that employees relocated voluntarily
to assist parishes that needed assistance.
The Thibodaux Regional Manager stated that she had quite a few state office employees
helping in her office. She also sent employees to the New Orleans and Slidell areas when the
offices began to open. “At another point, I sent staff to Lake Charles after Hurricane Rita
because we just weren’t having the volume that they were.”
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The Policy Sections Manager added that there were 2 employees displaced from New
Orleans working in the state office. He added that “New Orleans doesn’t have half the caseload
it had prior to the storm, so some of the staff are being moved around to ease the burden in other
places.” The New Orleans Regional Manager noted that since the storm her staff has decreased.
Pre-Katrina there were about 420 agents working in the region for the FSP. At the time of the
interview (August 30, 2006), about 250 FSP agents worked in the region.
In addition to the dedication and commitment from the staff, outside volunteers came to
Louisiana to help in whatever capacity that they could. The New Orleans Regional Manager
explained that some of the out-of-state volunteers brought equipment for the FSP to have and
use. This included computers, paper, pens, and water for the crowds. She added that the
National Guard contributed the success of the program by aiding those who waited in line to
either apply or receive benefits. Senators, the New Orleans mayor, and area police officers made
a presence and an effort to make the situation more comfortable. She added that “people were
passing out. We needed to find places were they could go inside, use the restroom, get a drink of
water.” In addition to this, portable restrooms, water, and ice were all donated to the FSP office.
Wal-Mart donated water to the Thibodaux Regional Manager’s office and was distributed
to the applicants waiting in lines. The Council on Aging set up a special application site at one
of the senior homes in Baton Rouge. The city police “got the media to put out an appeal for
people to just donate umbrellas that we could pass to the crowd. They could stand under the
umbrellas.” The Thibodaux Regional Manager added that “some young folks from the Church
of Scientology showed up” and offered to help.
FEMA also assisted the disaster program efforts. Temporary issuance sites were set up
since many of the office were damaged or completely destroyed. The Thibodaux Regional

66

Manager used the FEMA sites and “piggybacked on their resources.” FEMA had access to
security, electricity, and sometimes Internet.
Barriers during Implementation
The most often identified barriers that administrators faced during implementation of the
FSP during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were infrastructure damage, increased client volume,
vendor availability, client identification. A summary of barriers are shown in Table 13.
Table 13: Summary of barriers as reported by FSP administrators
FSP Administrator
Barriers
Magnitude of Storm
USDA Regional Manager
Increased Client Volume
Policy Section Manager
Increased Client Volume
Increased Client Volume
EBT Benefits Manager
Client ID
Director of Nutrition
Increased Client Volume
Education
Infrastructure Damage
Orleans Regional
Increased Client Volume
Manager
Vendor Availability
Client ID
Thibodaux Regional
Increased Client Volume
Manager
Infrastructure Damage
Lake Charles Regional
Increased Client Volume
Manager
Vendor Availability
Client ID

Hurricane
Katrina
Both
Both
Both
Both
Rita
Katrina
Katrina
Katrina
Both
Rita
Both
Both
Both

Infrastructure Damage. The most often identified barrier by the interviewed FSP
administrators was infrastructure damage. Within the Lake Charles Region, the Broad Street
office in Lake Charles was completely destroyed. To accommodate the DFSP applicants, the
office was temporarily moved to a church. Cameron Parish lost all of their records and were
require to “start from scratch.” Many offices in the Orleans Region were required to start from
scratch as well. Moreover, the entire region was redistricted to accommodate the different
enrollment needs of the area. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the Orleans Region was divided into
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parishes and districts. They included Algiers district, four offices in the East Bank of New
Orleans, Jefferson Parish, Plaquemines Parish, and St. Bernard Parish. After the storm, the
region was redistricted: one office in New Orleans, St. Bernard, Mid-town, and a combined
office for Gentilly, Mid-town, and Uptown (4 total).
Finding sites to accommodate the masses of people proved to be a major challenge for all
of the regional managers. At one point, hauling in an-18 wheeler was in discussion for the
Thibodaux Regional Manager.
Increased Client Volume. Regardless of having a place to accommodate the large
number of people applying to the disaster program, assisting the increased client volume proved
to be a major challenge. Although Louisiana did not run out of EBT cards, the Policy Sections
Manager had to personally drive everyday to pick-up and deliver a stock of cards. The vendor
JPMorgan supplied cards everyday to accommodate the volume of applicants.
The increase of applicants caused major traffic and parking problems. Lines wrapped
through the parking lots and into the streets. There weren’t enough parking spots in the parking
lots, so cars overflowed from the lots into the streets.
Vendor Availability. Many of the vendors that were set up to accept EBT cards were
damaged, destroyed, or unable to maintain operating hours due to the lack of employees. So,
although applicants were approved and received the EBT cards, there were not always vendors
who could sell them food. The USDA did respond by allowing some prepared foods to be
purchased with disaster program benefits. The New Orleans and Lake Charles Regional
Managers said this as a huge problem for the benefit recipients.
Client Identification. Many DFSP applicants evacuated without the identifying
documentation required for benefit approval. The EBT Manager said that there were “several”
incidents where people had “nothing.” In response to this problem, the Louisiana Department of
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Motor Vehicles offered replacement driver’s licenses or ID cards to those with photos on file.
When this happened, the New Orleans Regional Manager accepted “collateral statements” and
accepted whatever the applicants had. When possible, they accepted personal references. She
added that often neighbors and extended families were in lines together. The Lake Charles
Regional Manager agreed by adding that many of the requirements were waived and they were
forced to “take their word.”
Magnitude of Storms. This was the first time that the USDA released an evacuee policy
in response to initiating a disaster program. The magnitude of the storm was unexpected. The
EBT Benefits Manager agreed that this was a barrier to a normal disaster food stamp program.
The Orleans Regional Manager added to this concept when asked what barriers faced after
Hurricane Katrina. The Director of Nutrition Education and USDA Regional Manager stated
that the combination of Hurricane Katrina and Rita was massive and that everyone was “working
around the clock” to implement the program and serve the applicants.
Participants’ Suggestions for Future Disaster Policy
When asked about fraud prevention efforts, responses were directed to the Fraud and
Recovery department.4 Although, fraud and application design were not mentioned when asked
about the barriers to the successful implementation of the program, they were the most often
suggested for future policy. Moreover, the interviewees who responded to this question offered
information as to what was currently in effect after the end of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita’s
disaster food stamp program. Outside of the waivers released for the DFSP, the USDA Regional
Manager was not sure how to improve disaster response in the future.
Both the Policy Sections Manager and the Thibodaux Regional Manager described a
matrix that was designed by FNS staff in Louisiana to specifically define requirements for a
4

Fraud and Recovery Department was not permitted to participant in the study.
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parish to be declared a disaster area. The criteria to decide which parishes will be included in
future programs (one of three must be met):
•

50% of homes in parish are without power 48 hours after the disaster

•

Damage to the parish as a result of wind velocity greater than or equal to 96 miles
per hour

•

25% of the residential structures on the parish are affected by flooding. Flooding is
defined as water actually entering the structure.

They added that applications will not be processed in areas where a mandatory evacuation is in
affect. Staff will resume accepting applications when the evacuation orders have been lifted. In
addition, at least 10% of the approved EBT vendors must be able to operate. If not, the FDD will
come in and distribute commodities to households. The Policy Sections Manager added that this
was designed for a hurricane, not “an ice storm, flood, or terrorist bombing.”
The EBT Benefits Manager suggested that the disaster policy was enhanced so that it
requires information on all household members. This way multiple benefits cannot be received
within the same family and thus reducing fraud. The Orleans Regional Manager suggested that
each social security number of each member of the household be required during the application
process.
During this disaster program, denied applications were not kept on file. The EBT
Benefits Manager added that when some people became savvy at the application process, they
could have “taken advantage” of this. “Double checks” could decrease the amount of work. It
was suggested further that one way to double check was with a quality assurance team that could
monitor the issuance sites. The Lake Charles Regional Manager suggested that personnel from
the Office of Fraud and Recovery should be responsible for the checks and balances that should
be required. She thought that they could be an asset in helping employees and volunteers make
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sure that the policies and procedures were followed accurately. The Orleans Regional Manager
agreed.
The manager mentioned additional security-minded suggestions for future policy. In
addition to adding checks and balances to the application process, she wanted to see increased
information required on the application. In her experience, she witnessed many affluent families
“taking advantage” of the system. She thought that families were choosing not to provide
identification, suggesting that “lack of proof of ID was selective.” In addition, she would like to
see more time pass between the time of application and approval; noting further that, “these
people aren’t starving. There is time.”
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
This project was designed to gain insight to the overall experience of the NSLP and FSP
in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Interviews were conducted to obtain predisposing,
enabling, and reinforcing factors study participants faced while implementing the programs and
their suggestions for future disaster policies and procedures.
Administrative Assessment
The first objective of this study was to obtain an administrative assessment of the policies
and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This
assessment includes pre-disaster program administration procedures how they may have changed
in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Although not asked in the NSLP and FSP interviews,
the extent of involvement during the Hurricane “Pam” drill as follow up question would gain
insight to the hurricane preparedness of the programs. From this, a comparison between how
much was replicated during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and what was unable to be predicted
could have been drawn.
National School Lunch Program
SFA supervisors said that the disaster plans mainly “dealt with commodities” and “not
logistics” dealing with procedures that would contribute to feeding children after disasters.
Based in the discussions with the SFA supervisors, the CNP director did not provide the district a
report designed from Bulletin 1196 (Appendix A), detailing the 20 Disaster Relief Feeding Plan
objectives. Moreover, the state CNP director may have assumed it was the responsibility of the
individual SFA.
In the interview with the School Food and Nutrition Services of New Orleans SFA
Director, it was stated that “we [the SFA supervisors] are the ones who establishes that policy
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and implement it at the school[s].” The comment from the St. James Parish SFA director,
“whatever guidelines are required in 1196” suggests that objectives outlined in Bulletin 1196
were provided, but that a Disaster Relief Feeding Plan was not.
This barrier has led to some SFA supervisors to update the emergency contacts sheet.
Since the hurricanes, the SFA supervisor for St. James Parish has developed a detailed
Emergency Readiness Plan designed to meet the specific needs of the St. James Parish school
foodservice operation. Emergency Response Team Coordinators were designated and duties
assigned to each role.
The waivers for the NSLP released by the USDA after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
temporarily changed policies and procedures and enabled the implementation of the NSLP after
the storms. For example, verification of income was temporarily suspended for the 2005-2006
school year and the Free and Reduced Lunch Claims report deadline for August 2005 was
extended from November 31, 2005 (Appendix G). While the primary goals of the waivers was to
enable the SFA supervisors to feed the children, they also resulted in decreased administrative
burden which further facilitated the implementation of the program.
Louisiana’s NSLP has a sophisticated reported system that is implemented by the SFA
supervisors, regardless of disaster. Although reporting was less rigorous after the storms and for
the remainder of the 2005-2006 school year, the same reporting mechanism was used to count
students receiving free and reduced lunch. Reporting is discussed further as it relates to the
enablers of implementation.
Food Stamp Program
The massive Disaster Food Stamp Handbook published in May 1995 extensively details
pre-disaster planning, response, and follow-up (59, 61). In addition, FNS published an EBT
Disaster Manual (36-39).
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Surprisingly, when asked what pre-disaster preparations were in place, the handbook was
mentioned only by the Southwest Region Section Chief. The EBT Disaster Manual was
mentioned only by the EBT Sections Manager; however neither of the guides was mentioned as
enablers to the implementation of the DFSP. This suggests that either the guides were used as
reference for state and regional administration, but not at the sites where disaster food stamp
benefits were being administered.
The Thibodaux Regional Manager said that after Hurricane Rita a statewide committee
was formed to come up with recommendations, processes, and procedures. It was added that this
was written by the OFS Policy Sections Manager. When interviewed, the Policy Sections
Manager stated that because the DFSP policy was a federal program, Louisiana administrators
could not make any changes to it. Addressing this issue after the hurricanes, the OFS
administration added a basic disaster policy to the regular FSP. In May 2006, the state office
held a training class for all of the department staff.
In remains unclear whether or not the handbooks were used in response to the hurricanes.
They were mentioned by state staff, but not detailed by regional managers implementing the
program directly. Both the Thibodaux and Lake Charles Regional Managers explained that the
staff had experience with other DFSP after Hurricanes Lily and Ivan, but neither of the storms
was of the magnitude of Katrina or Rita. It is unclear as to whether the experience reported by
the regional managers refers to familiarity using the handbooks as a policy to guide
implementation of the programs or if the reported experience refers to the overall disaster
response. It is plausible that if the disaster manuals, both the DFSP and the EBT, were used
thoroughly, then the regional managers and experienced staff would mention them as either aids
or hindrances during our discussions. A sensible alternative to this theory is that the state
administrators were the primary implementers of the program, relaying only significant
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procedure information to the regions specific to the hurricanes, as opposed the manuals. This
topic warrants further study.
It appears that from the national level, the FSP had a more detailed pre-disaster and
disaster response guide than the NSLP; although, the extent of the use and from whom is vague,
because it wasn’t mentioned in the interviews with regional managers. On a state level, the
NSLP seemed to have more pre-disaster planning resources available than the FSP. The
responsibility for the development and use of Chapter 31 in Bulletin 1196 is also unclear. In
both cases, many of the SFA supervisors and FSP regional managers have taken steps to update
or develop a procedural guide specific to their area of jurisdiction.
Enabling and Reinforcing Factors of the Disaster Plans
The second objective of the study was to obtain the successes of the disaster plan
implementation by associating the enabling and reinforcing factors with program policy, budget,
reporting, and administration delivery following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Results from the study indicate that there were some similarities and differences between the
enabling and reinforcing factors of the NSLP and the FSP.
National School Lunch Program
The waivers released by the USDA were the enablers most often mentioned during
interviews with administrators from the NSLP. The waivers primary purpose was to relax
eligibility, meal pattern requirement, reporting and verification, consequently increased
reimbursement and decreased the massive administrative burden caused by the catastrophic
impact of the storms. The dedication of the staff and community was also a reinforcing factor of
the NSLP after the storms.
The annual income requirements set by the FNS were redefined after Hurricane Katrina
and extended after Rita so that school aged children from households receiving disaster food
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stamp benefits and families displaced by the storms were automatically eligible for free lunches.
Children paying full price for lunches prior to Hurricane Katrina were reimbursed $.23 for
reimbursable meals purchased. The reimbursement rate for many children increased to $2.40
after Hurricane Katrina (16). While it was reported that the schools in Cameron Parish and the
School Food and Nutrition Service of New Orleans endured the most infrastructure damage,
almost all of the schools in south Louisiana were closed for some period of time after either or
both of the storms. As a result, the SFA lost income. The increased number of reimbursable
meals helped the schools recoup some of the financial losses due to school closures. The SFA
with the greatest cost associated with hurricane recovery, Archdiocese of New Orleans,
suggested that this waiver stay effective for a longer period of time so that more losses could be
recouped. If the USDA opted to extend for a longer period of time, the definition of “displaced”
would have to be reconsidered and specifically described.
The waiver released by the USDA resulting allowing flexible meal patterns and extend
reporting deadlines were also mentioned as enabling factors. However, it is what resulted from
the flexibility that truly enabled the state and local state to spend more time on activities that
would feed the children. These activities included locating vendors who have food, operable
trucks, and staff to make deliveries and meal deliveries to schools where kitchens were
destroyed.
While not mentioned in the interviews with the administration from the NSLP, it can be
assumed that after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, SFA were forced to compete for resources.
Surprisingly, only the Lafayette diocese and St. Martin Parish SFA directors pooled resources to
share food deliveries. Although, the consortium of southwest SFA includes Cameron Parish,
pooling resources was not mentioned in the interview with the Cameron Parish SFA supervisor.
Allowing meal flexibility may have helped alleviate some of the competition. For example,
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parishes may have been able to access substitute food choices quickly and cheaply from a nearby
vendor. Alternatively, some foods were not available, as many vendor operations were adversely
affected by the storms.
A total of 38 parishes in Louisiana were declared disaster areas by FEMA and were
relieved of the NSLP income verification requirement from the USDA. In addition to alleviating
administrative burden, it can be assumed that eliminating the paperwork associated with
verification, also eliminated the space and equipment required to maintain the records.
For these reasons, it is possible that the abolishment of verification requirements may
have led to increased incidents of fraud. With little or no detection, a school food service
employee may have chosen to ignore verification requirements from the applicants.
Alternatively, families who were aware of the post-disaster policies may have purposely left
income statements, knowing the application would be approved based on the income that they
verbally declared.
This concept contradicts a primary reinforcing factor reported by the SFA supervisors
and state administration. Dedication of the staff and community contributed to strength of the
program and its successful implementation during the vulnerable response phase of the disaster.
As reported by many SFA supervisors, staff, families, churches, and civic organizations cleaned
out refrigerators, made donations, and “just did everything.” This response is consistent with
current literature (66). As mentioned by Paton and Johnson, resilience to a disaster is related to
the ability of a community to combine abilities and experiences to face the related changes and
challenges. They add that this can lead to growth within the community and the organization.
Therefore, it is possible to conclude the dedication of the staff and community was a factor
contributing to the overall shift from the response phase of disaster management to the recovery
phase.
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Food Stamp Program
The waivers released by the USDA and the dedication of the staff were most frequently
mentioned as enablers during interviews with administrators from the FSP (Appendix I). The
Southwest Region Sections Chief noted that it was the speed with which the waivers were
released by the USDA that enabled the implementation of the program. The Sections Chief
added that the National Evacuee Policy was implemented by the USDA to aid the evacuees
residing outside Louisiana and designed for states that were not concurrently operating a disaster
program.
Interestingly, the Policy Sections Manager said that the release of the National Evacuee
Policy confused some applicants and staff members. The policy treated evacuees differently
depending on whether they had evacuated. Louisiana requested a waiver not to include these
regulations and was approved. However, applicants who came to issuance sites after researching
eligibility from the FNS web-site may have been faced with conflicting information at the
issuance sites in Louisiana. Louisiana’s income requirement for the DFSP after Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita was not published on the web-site and wasn’t discussed during the interviews
with FSP administrators. To gain more insight to this topic, a follow up question could elicit how
the benefits administrators approved or denied applications.
Prior to and unrelated to Hurricane Katrina, the DSS changed the state policy allowing
Louisiana residents to apply for food stamps in any parish in Louisiana. The policy was
originally designed to help families who lived close to an OFS office in a neighboring parish.
Although, this was not related to a DFSP, state administrators realized that this could be
beneficial during a disaster. It proved to be a fundamentally enabling factor while implementing
the disaster plan because many residents of south Louisiana were unable to return home for
several weeks or months (18).
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Both the NSLP and FSP attributed the success of the programs to the dedication of the
staff and the waivers released by the USDA. Both of these enabling factors led to a decreased
administrative burden that resulted in an increase of activities to support food security.
Barriers to the Implementation of the Disaster Plans
The third objective of this study was to gain understanding of the barriers faced while
trying to implement the disaster NSLP and FSP programs and how they led to changes in
policies or procedures associated, budget, reporting, and administration activities. The study
revealed similarities and differences between the programs.
National School Lunch Program
Frequently mentioned barriers to the implementation of the NSLP in the wake of the
storms were pre-disaster pre-preparedness, communication, and availability of food. From the
discussions with the NSLP administrators, understanding of who was responsible for which roles
of the pre-disaster planning was ambiguous.
Communication was a barrier faced during the implementation of the NSLP during the
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. NSLP administrators had limited ability to communicate with the
state office, regional staff, and vendors. Although the CNP director in the state office set up five
different mechanisms for contact, little could have been done without electricity or cellular
service. Under these circumstances, there is little that individual SFA or states can do to alleviate
this barrier. The expense of satellite phones is not justifiable.
The only reliable form of communication is face-to-face interaction. This can involve
driving long distances to relay important disaster information. Face-to-face interactions are more
costly than telephone calls, e-mails, faxes, and text messaging, and require more time to
accomplish, but it some cases it may be the only mechanism to communicate.
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Food availability due to the loss of food as a result of a storm or the inability to obtain
food because of damage to infrastructure and resources was a major barrier that the NSLP faced
during the implementation of a disaster plan. Although Cameron Parish was running an extended
day program, the USDA did not approve a waiver for snacks to be reimbursable.
Without the support from the outside community, Cameron Parish would have been
unable to feed students. The reason why the waiver was not approved was not disclosed during
the interview; however, the failure of the USDA to approve the waiver under these specific
circumstances hindered the principal role of the federal food assistance programs- to reduce
hunger by increasing food purchasing power (1).
Food Stamp Program
Statements mentioned by the OFS administrators suggested that increased client volume
and lack of client identification were barriers while implementing the DFSP. Additionally, many
of the store owners and their businesses were adversely impacted by the storms which hindered
access to food in some areas.
Future Suggestions
The fourth objective of this study was to relay suggestion from the NSLP and FSP
administrators for future disaster policies and procedures. In some cases, enablers and barriers of
program implementation were addressed by the participants.
National School Lunch Program
Topics that were most often mentioned for future policies were the USDA and
communication. All of the NSLP SFA supervisors and state staff agreed that the USDA waivers
released by the USDA should be replicated for each disaster. Most suggested that
communication was an important topic to be addressed, but technological barriers seemed
insurmountable.
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Unexpectedly, many of the NSLP regional managers did not mention strengthening or
further detailing disaster policies and procedures; although some had mentioned steps taken to
eradicate future problems. For example, SFA supervisors made keys to all of the kitchens so that
after a disaster the kitchens could be accessed immediately.
Food Stamp Program
In contrast to the National School Lunch Program, the Food Stamp Program
administrators addressed barriers as well as issues that were not discusses previously in the
interview, such as fraud and applications. It was suggested administering a more security
minded application after a disaster may reduce fraudulent activities. However, the stories of
massive lines and applicant discomfort suggest that lengthening the application process may not
be feasible. It is possible that some of the changes that Louisiana’s FSP is trying to implement,
for example, the Disaster Matrix for hurricanes may alleviate some of the client demand, but,
additionally, it can not be predicted how the next disaster will affect the region. Because little
information was available, it is difficult to determine what information from the application was
most critical in establishing disaster food stamp benefits eligibility.
Changes in Enrollment
The study tracked the changes in enrollment of the NSLP and FSP after Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. The results of the enrollment changes are located in appendices J-L.
National School Lunch
Appendix J charts the yearly enrollment of the NSLP from October 2002-2005 and then
from December 2005-May 2006 (the end of the 2005-2006 SY and when all of the NSLP
disaster waivers expire) for Cameron, St. Martin, East Baton Rouge, St. Charles, St. James, and
Tangipahoa Parishes only. Unlike, the DFSP application system, the system used by the schools
to input student data requires the same details for normal and disaster circumstances. A
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breakdown of the socioeconomic demographics, including: gender, race, grade, and free or
reduced meal status in the parish can be tracked during disaster response and recovery. The
accuracy of the information relies on the person who inputs the data. During disaster
circumstances, when time and manpower are limited, as asserted by the SFA supervisors,
coupled with decreased verification and reporting requirements may lead to erroneous reports;
and therefore inaccurate budgets, purchase orders, and reimbursement rates.
Based on the waivers released by the USDA, the increase in students receiving free lunch
is expected. All of the reported parishes exemplified enrollment changes based on the waivers:
an increase in the number of students enrolled in the school and participating in a meal program.
Although, these patterns were not recorded for the Archdiocese of New Orleans, who
also experienced a sharp decline in student enrollment, the enrollment trends for Cameron Parish
exemplified the experience. In October 2005, no students were reported because four of the six
schools were destroyed and closed for the entire month. The remaining two schools were being
cleaned and prepared for all of the students to start school at the beginning of October. When the
schools opened, the SFA supervisor reported all of the students free until the end of the 20052006 school year.
Food Stamp Program
Because the subsystem designed for the DFSP is abbreviated, less information can be
extrapolated and interpreted. Surprisingly, reports published by the OFS do not reveal of which
parish the applicant is a permanent resident, or how many applications were processed and
approved in each parish (Appendix K). In a follow-up question directed to the Policy Sections
Manager, it was determined that this information is not readily available. However, information
regarding the total number of households served and the amount benefits allocated was provided.
The current reports by the OFS estimate that 496,587 households received approximately
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$409,387,689 in DFSP benefits in Louisiana from after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita from
September 2005 through November 2005.
However, an insight to the movement of recipients of the regular FSP may be
extrapolated from the published information (Appendix L). In October, after Hurricane Rita, the
average benefit increased. It can be concluded that during this time, recipients of the regular FSP
received a supplement to increase the benefits to the maximum amount allowed by the number in
the household.
Appendix K highlights the number of total households, recipients and cased closed as a
result of the recipient moving out of the state for regular FSP recipients. After Hurricane Rita,
there is a sharp increase in the cases closed as a result of recipients moving out of the state and a
steady decrease in total enrollment. This suggests that families within the income bracket to be
eligible for regular food stamps were moving out of Louisiana and not returning. The permanent
relocation out of Louisiana may be a result of the federal government and Louisiana’s responses
and recovery efforts after to the storms. This is consistent with the population reports from
Birmingham, Houston, and Atlanta (23-26).
Disaster, Food Assistance Programs and Future Directions
This study will add to the minimal research on the relationship between disasters and
federal food assistance programs and creates a foundation for follow-up studies. Development of
an instrument to quantify and correlate federal food assistance disaster programs and food
security would be an asset to both the NSLP and FSP. If designed, a concrete and definitive
report could be used to support or oppose policy updates. Additionally, tracking and measuring
incidents of fraud may strengthen the integrity of future disaster programs.
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National School Lunch Program
A collaboration of local and state supervisors to define the roles and responsibilities of
each department during a disaster may enable future disaster responses. Bulletin 1196 and the
Stafford Act should be guides to design a disaster plan. Kitchen managers in each district should
use the storm experience to design a detailed and complete disaster manual. Disaster manuals
from each kitchen should be collected and approved by the SFA supervisor. In turn, using the
information from the kitchen managers and the experience of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, each
SFA supervisor in Louisiana should customize a detailed disaster policy and procedure
guidebook which should be approved by the state. To enforce both the state and local policy,
yearly trainings should be enforced for all school food service employees; additionally, as the
literature suggests, these responsibilities and procedures should be revisited often (64-64).
Key components to the updated disaster plan should include communication and
environmental hazards, such as mold and food salvage. When telephone and cellular service is
unavailable, an alternative communication system should be highlighted in the manual. For
example, neighboring parishes could design a relay system to disseminate information from the
state office in East Baton Rouge Parish.
The results of the study link the experiences of the participating parishes. State
administrators and SFA supervisors should evaluate the experiences of their colleagues. At this
time, plans to pool resources during a disaster can be arranged.
Food Stamp Program
A follow-up study should be conducted to determine the extent to which the FNS
Disaster Manual was used in state, regional, and local capacities and to what degree the manual
enabled program implementation. The unusual circumstances of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
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most likely created scenarios that were not discussed in the manual. This should result in an
updated guide to include procedures on more disaster scenarios.
Quantities of applications at individual issuance sites and within parishes should be
investigated and reported. If possible, this information could be linked to the applicants’ home
parish and city. Geographical information from this information should be quantified. As a
result, patterns of movement can be tracked and used to select a location for future disaster
issuance sites.
The abbreviated DFSP applications and subsystem should be considered and weighed
against crowd control, time, and fraud. A system that requires more details, but is more time
effective should be designed.
Limitations
There were several limitations to this study. First, the amount of time that elapsed
between the hurricanes and the interviews may have changed the perceptions of the events.
Several of the participants did not remember events surrounding the hurricanes and responded “I
don’t remember” or “everything was such a blur” to the questions. This may not have happened
if the interviews were conducted immediately after the event. This may not have been practical
because the hurricanes were traumatic and the administrators needed time to recover. However,
it proved to be a limitation to gaining the overall experience of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina and Rita.
Second, a snowball sampling technique was used to find participants. Because the sample
was not randomly selected, the results of the study may not give an accurate depiction of south
Louisiana’s experience. The enabling factors and barriers to the implementation of disaster plans
may not reflect all of the parishes affected by the storms. To address this limitation, an attempt
was made, primarily with the NSLP, to invite SFA supervisors with varying experiences to
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participate. Interviews were concluded when the patterns and themes emerged and no new
information was learned.
It is probable that the experiences of SFA supervisors from the Orleans Public Schools
SFA, St. Bernard Parish School Board, St. Tammany Parish School Board, Jefferson Parish
Public School System, and Livingston Parish School Board would have contributed to the
research. The key informants listed were profoundly impacted from the storms and may have
contributed deeper understanding the response of the NSLP after the storms.
Additionally, key informants from the FSP did not participate in the study. In this case,
the interviews were stopped when all of the possible participants were exhausted. Permission to
interview the directors of the Fraud and Recovery Section, Field Operations Section, Budget
Section would have greatly increased the perspective of the barriers and enabling factors during
the implementation of the DFSP after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Two Regional Managers from the OFS opted not to have the interviews recorded. In
contrast to the taped interviews, the only data source from the discussions with the Lake Charles
and Orleans regional managers were the field notes taken at the interview. It can not be
determined whether this impacted data analysis of the DFSP.
Conclusion
The effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita of Louisiana and the Gulf Coast region in the
US were catastrophic. As a result, much of Louisiana remains lurking in the recovery phase of
disaster. It is apparent that both the NSLP and the FSP were successful during the response
phase, when immediate and speedy assistance is critical (49). The national, regional, and local
administrators of the NSLP and FSP implemented urgent solutions which ultimately and
profoundly helped families and thus communities access food resources through school lunches
and food stamp benefits.
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One of the fundamental successes of the implementation of the programs was the
enduring focus on the mission of the respective programs. As mentioned in the interviews, the
NSLP and FSP administrators took initiative to make sure that kitchens were cleaned, sanitation
reviews were passed, food was served, and disaster food stamp benefits were dispensed. This
concept compared to the response of the federal government suggests that more disaster
preparedness details and clarity of roles and responsibility may lead to increased bureaucracy
and a less effective response to the immediate needs of the community. Experience will widen
the line between the necessary disaster roles, responsibility and procedures and impromptu
activities that are required for an effective and immediate response.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita presented a catastrophic situation in Louisiana and the Gulf
Coast region that led to massive disruption of social and economic systems. While it appears
that decreased burden on administration coupled with the availability of resources is the formula
for successful NSLP and FSP disaster response, this represents only part of the formula. Equally
as important, are the people that even under exhausting and overwhelming conditions committed
to the challenges that emerged with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
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APPENDIX B
FOUR PHASES OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT

Emergency Management

MITIGATION

Planning

Preparedness

Structural measures

RESPONSE

Relief

Non-Structural measures

RECOVERY

Reconstruction

Structural and Non-Structural measures

Figure 1: Four phases of disaster management (Adapted from Rodrigues AS, et al. and Ambrose S, et al.)
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APPENDIX C
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
SUBMITTED FORM
Abstract:
The purpose of the proposed study is to describe the response and evaluate the resiliency of
Louisiana’s Food Stamp Program and National School Lunch Program in the wake of and in the
months shortly following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. I will be recording interviews conducted
with state administrators from the two aforementioned agencies.

Instruments:
The interview questionnaire for the Food Stamp Program and the National School Lunch
Program are attached. The questions in both interviews were designed by the principle
investigator and approved by Dr. Carol O’Neil and Dr. Annrose Guarino in the LSU School of
Human Ecology.

Study Specifics:
The use of human subjects is necessary for two reasons. A human perspective of the response
and resiliency of the Food Stamp Program and the National School Lunch Program is crucial to
the design of the study and therefore requires human participation. Secondly, the interview will
ask questions that have not yet been publicly documented.
Specific Sites of Data Collection:
1. Department of Education (National School Lunch Program)
2. Office of Family Support- local offices (Food Stamp Program)
3. Southern University (Food Stamp Program)
No invasive procedures will be used.
Physical, Psychological, and Social Risks: There are no known physical, psychological, and
social risks to the proposed study.
Recruitment Pool: Experts informants were selected by job title and through recommendations
from Food Stamp Program and National School Lunch Program administrators.
Vulnerable Population: No known vulnerable population will be included in the study.
Informed Consent: The interview will begin with an oral explanation of the study purpose and
design. The informants may choose to discontinue the interview at anytime.
This study is not confidential and informants will be directly sited in the thesis project.
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Questionnaire for Louisiana Department of Education

Thank you for taking time today to help me gather information about how Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita impacted the National School Lunch Program in Louisiana in the wake of the disasters
and in the months shortly following.
I am going to ask you several questions. These questions will be the same for all of the
interviews conducted with personnel working with the National School Lunch Program.
I would like to use a tape recorder to document our conversation. Are you comfortable with
this? I also take notes as we talk. Usually I am writing a question or topic that I would like to
learn more about.
The discussion today will consist of several open ended questions. At the end, I will ask you if
you have any further comments that you think are important to consider that I did not ask.
Are you ready to get started?
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1. With regard to the National School Lunch Program (NSLP), what emergency/disaster
preparations did the Louisiana Department of Education (LADOE) have in place prior to
the arrival of Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005?

2. Following both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the LADOE made an effort to ensure that
students were fed. What enabled the success of the program after Hurricane Katrina?

3. What barriers did the Louisiana Department of Education face while trying to implement
the NSLP disaster plan after Hurricane Katrina?

4. Did these post-Hurricane Katrina barriers lead to changes in policy prior to Hurricane
Rita?

5. If so, were these changes temporary or permanent?

6. Did the arrival of Hurricane Rita on September 24, 2005 compound or reinforce any
changes to Louisiana’s NSLP?

7. What enabled the success of Louisiana’s NSLP after Hurricane Rita?

8. What barriers did the LADOE face while trying to implement the NSLP disaster plan
after Hurricane Rita?

9. Did these post-Hurricane Rita barriers lead to changes in policy?

10. If so, were these changes temporary or permanent?

11. What parts of the NSLP disaster/emergency policy, if any, were designed for decisions to
be made by the parish? District? School? How was this dependant on the nature or
degree of the disaster or emergency?

12. With regard to the Louisiana National School Lunch Program, did Hurricane Katrina
require the Louisiana Department of Education to re-budget federal and state NSLP funds
among parishes?
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13. Did the revised budget change with the arrival of Hurricane Rita on September 24, 2005?
If so, how?

14. If yes, how did re-budgeting affect Louisiana’s ability to offer free and reduced lunch in
the 2005-2006 school year?

15. Will the changes in the policy and budget after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita affect future
national, state, or local disaster policy? If so, how?

16. Will these changes in the NSLP policy and budget affect Louisiana’s ability to feed
school-aged children in the future?

17. Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, how was participation and eligibility reported by
parish/city public school districts?

18. Were Louisiana NSLP employees relocated to other parishes after Hurricane Katrina to
help relieve schools that were short-staffed?

19. Was personnel shifted between parishes after Hurricane Rita?

20. How did school foodservice and administration handle instances where employees could
not be located? For example:
a. Did new foodservice personnel have to be temporarily assigned or hired?
b. Were out-of-state volunteers recruited to assist? In-state volunteers?

21. In parishes where schools were operating after the hurricanes, I can imagine that
infrastructure damage or a change in student attendance prevented schools from
executing their normal foodservice operation. Some schools were completely destroyed.
Some kitchens were flooded and others were not large enough to prepare meals for the
newly enlarged student population. In other cases, roads to and from affected areas were
damaged. What are some examples of how some schools’ foodservice handled these
challenges?
22. What effects did the hurricanes have on Louisiana’s NSLP food access and inventory?

23. Were there costs associated with NSLP personnel and infrastructure changes, shifts in
student enrollment, or the actual physical loss of food?
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24. It is my understanding based on the August 2005 Louisiana Food and Nutrition Program
Policies of Operation Part XLIX. Bulletin 1196, the American Red Cross and the USDA
collaborate during natural disasters. How was the Red Cross able to assist Louisiana with
the delivery of school food service after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita?

25. Which and to what capacity were other civic organizations able to assist the NSLP in
Louisiana after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita?

26. If so, did this contribute to the Louisiana Department of Education’s ability to meet the
needs of the National School Lunch Program?

27. On August 31, 2005, the USDA e-mailed a memorandum to Special Nutrition Programs
in all regional and state Agencies and Child Nutrition Programs in all states titled
Emergency Feeding of School Children in Areas Devastated by Hurricane Katrina. What
steps did the state administrators take to let evacuated students and families know that
they were automatically eligible for free lunches? How was the state effort different from
the local and national efforts?

28. Do you have any suggestions for future NSLP disaster policy in Louisiana or in the
United States?

29. Are there any other additional comments that you would like to add that you feel are
important to include with regard to the National School Lunch Program in Louisiana
following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita?

30. Do you have any recommendations for others with whom I should interview?

106

APPENDIX E
NSLP CONSENT FORM

107

**** KEEP THIS FOR YOUR INFORMATION ****
The Resiliency of Louisiana’s Food Stamp Program and National School Lunch Program
following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Emily Whelan
Work: (225) 578-8816
Cell: (713) 502-1142
School of Human Ecology
LSU AgCenter
Baton Rouge, LA 70803
Email: ewhela1@lsu.edu

1. Study Title: The Resiliency of Louisiana’s Food Stamp Program (FSP) and National
School Lunch Program (NSLP) following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
2. Participants: Regional, state, and local FSP and NSLP administrators
3. Performance Site: Offices of FSP and NSLP administrators
4. Investigators: The following investigators are available for questions about this study,
M-F, 8:00 AM- 4:30 PM
Emily Whelan (225) 578-8816
Dr. Carol O’Neil (225) 578-1631
Dr. Annrose Guarino (225) 578- 1425
5. Purpose of the Study: The purpose of this research project is to explore Louisiana’s FSP
and NSLP response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and assess pre-disaster plan and postdisaster implementation in order to provide insight to the strengths and weakness of the
disaster response.
6. Number of subjects: 30
7. Study Procedures: Qualitative questions will be asked during an interview between the
principal investigator and the administrator. The interview will be taped and transcribed
verbatim. Impressions provided by the expert informant will be used to provide insight
to the strengths and weakness of the disaster response.
8. Risks: There are no known physical or psychological risks associated with this study.
None of the questions are of a personal or clinical nature.
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****** TURN OVER FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ******
9. Right to Refuse: Subjects may choose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at
any time. Participants may also choose not to answer specific questions from the
interview.
10. Privacy: Results of the study may be published. Identifying information will be included
in the publication and are not confidential. Results will be released to the participants of
the study and may be used in a presentation.

The study has been discussed with me and all my questions have been answered. I may direct
additional questions regarding study specifics to the investigators. If I have questions about
subjects' rights or other concerns, I can contact Michael Keenan, LSU AgCenter Institutional
Review Board, (225) 578-1708. I agree to participate in the study described above and
acknowledge the investigator's obligation to provide me with a signed copy of this consent
form.
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**** RETURN TO INTERVIEWER ****
The Resiliency of Louisiana’s Food Stamp Program and National School Lunch Program
following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Emily Whelan
Work: (225) 578-8816
Cell: (713) 502-1142
School of Human Ecology
LSU AgCenter
Baton Rouge, LA 70803
Email: ewhela1@lsu.edu

11. Study Title: The Resiliency of Louisiana’s Food Stamp Program (FSP) and National
School Lunch Program (NSLP) following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
12. Participants: Regional, state, and local FSP and NSLP administrators
13. Performance Site: Offices of FSP and NSLP administrators
14. Investigators: The following investigators are available for questions about this study,
M-F, 8:00 AM- 4:30 PM
Emily Whelan (225) 578-8816
Dr. Carol O’Neil (225) 578-1631
Dr. Annrose Guarino (225) 578- 1425
15. Purpose of the Study: The purpose of this research project is to explore Louisiana’s FSP
and NSLP response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and assess pre-disaster plan and postdisaster implementation in order to provide insight to the strengths and weakness of the
disaster response.
16. Number of subjects: 30
17. Study Procedures: Qualitative questions will be asked during an interview between the
principal investigator and the administrator. The interview will be taped and transcribed
verbatim. Impressions provided by the expert informant will be used to provide insight
to the strengths and weakness of the disaster response.
18. Risks: There are no known physical or psychological risks associated with this study.
None of the questions are of a personal or clinical nature.
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****** TURN OVER FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ******
19. Right to Refuse: Subjects may choose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at
any time. Participants may also choose not to answer specific questions from the
interview.
20. Privacy: Results of the study may be published. Identifying information will be included
in the publication and are not confidential. Results will be released to the participants of
the study and may be used in a presentation.

The study has been discussed with me and all my questions have been answered. I may direct
additional questions regarding study specifics to the investigators. If I have questions about
subjects' rights or other concerns, I can contact Michael Keenan, LSU AgCenter Institutional
Review Board, (225) 578-1708. I agree to participate in the study described above and
acknowledge the investigator's obligation to provide me with a signed copy of this consent
form.

_____________________________________________________________________
Signature of Subject
Date

Signature of Interviewer

Date
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Questionnaire for Department of Social Services/Office of Family Support

Thank you for taking time today to help me gather information about how Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita impacted the Food Stamp Program in Louisiana in the wake of the disasters and in
the months shortly following.
I am going to ask you several questions. These questions will be the same for all of the
interviews conducted with personnel working with Louisiana’s Food Stamp Program.
I would like to use a tape recorder to document our conversation. Are you comfortable with
this? I also take notes as we talk. Usually I am writing a question or topic that I would like
to learn more about.
The discussion today will consist of several open ended questions. At the end, I will ask you
if you have any further comments that you think are important to consider that I did not ask.
Are you ready to get started?
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1. With regard to the Food Stamp Program, what emergency/disaster preparations did the
Louisiana Department of Social Services (DSS) have in place prior to Hurricanes Katrina
on August 29, 2005?

2. Following both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Louisiana DSS made an effort to ensure
that residents of disaster areas had access to the Disaster Food Stamp Program (DFSP).
What enabled the success of the program after Hurricane Katrina?

3. What barriers did the Louisiana DSS face while trying to implement the DFSP plan after
Hurricane Katrina?

4. Did these post-Hurricane Katrina barriers lead to changes in policy prior to Hurricane
Rita?

5. If so, were these changes temporary or permanent?

6. Did the arrival of Hurricane Rita on September 24, 2005, compound or reinforce any
changes to Louisiana’s DFSP?

7. What enabled the success of Louisiana’s DFSP after Hurricane Rita?

8. What barriers did the Louisiana DSS face while trying to implement the DFSP plan after
Hurricane Rita?

9. Did these post-Hurricane Rita barriers lead to changes in disaster policy?

10. If so, were these changes temporary or permanent?

11. Did Louisiana adapt the national Disaster Food Stamp Program (DFSP) application or
use a state-specific application? If Louisiana used a state-specific application, how was
the DFSP application adapted for Louisiana? Hurricane Katrina? Hurricane Rita?

12. Were adaptations to the DFSP application dependent on the nature or degree of the
disaster?
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13. Will any of these changes permanently affect the eligibility or disaster policy?

14. With regard to the DFSP, did Hurricane Katrina require the LA DSS re-budget federal
and state funds among parishes?

15. If so, how did the revised budget change with the arrival of Hurricane Rita on September
24, 2005?

16. How did the re-budgeting affect Louisiana’s ability to offer non-Disaster Food Stamps in
the 2006 fiscal year and in the near future while rebuilding of Louisiana’s Gulf Coast?

17. How will changes in the policy and budget after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita affect future
national, state, or regional disaster policy?

18. How will the changes in the policy and budget effect Louisiana’s ability to provide
nutrition assistance during the next emergency?

19. Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, how was participation and eligibility reported by
cities? Parishes? State?

20. What steps did the state administrators take to let evacuated families know that they were
automatically eligible for the DFSP? How was the state effort different from the local
and national efforts?

21. Were Louisiana DSS employees relocated or reassigned to other parishes after Hurricane
Katrina to help relieve increased administration burden?

22. Were temporary application/issuance sites coordinated in any parishes in Louisiana in
order to increase access to the DFSP?

23. If so, where in Louisiana were the temporary application/issuance sites set up?

24. How did Louisiana’s DSS handle instances where OFS Family Assistance employees
could not be located? For example:
a. Did new personnel have to be temporarily assigned or hired?
b. Were out-of-state or in-state volunteers recruited to assist?
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25. How were food stamps issued to Louisiana residents affected by Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita when Social Security cards, verification of identity, proof of residence, and income
information were not available?

26. In parishes where OFS offices were operating, I can imagine that infrastructure damage
may have prevented agents from normally executing operations. Some offices were
completely destroyed. Others were flooded or not large enough to accommodate
increased traffic. In other cases, roads to and from affected areas were damaged. What
are some examples of how DSS handled these challenges?

27. Facing the same infrastructure damage, how were EBT cards acquired and physically
distributed?

28. What fraud prevention efforts did the Louisiana DSS administer after Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita?

29. How did the federal staff of the Disaster Response Assistance Team (DART) assist
Louisiana’s DFSP?

30. Do you have any suggestions for future DFSP policy in Louisiana or the United States?

31. Are there any additional comments that you would like to add that you feel are important
to include with regard to the DFSP in Louisiana following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita?

32. Do you have any recommendations for others with whom I should interview?
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**** RETURN TO INTERVIEWER ****

The Resiliency of Louisiana’s Food Stamp Program and National School Lunch Program
following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Emily Whelan
Work: (225) 578-8816
Cell: (713) 502-1142
School of Human Ecology
LSU AgCenter
Baton Rouge, LA 70803
Email: ewhela1@lsu.edu

21. Study Title: The Resiliency of Louisiana’s Food Stamp Program (FSP) and National
School Lunch Program (NSLP) following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
22. Participants: Regional, state, and local FSP and NSLP administrators
23. Performance Site: Offices of FSP and NSLP administrators
24. Investigators: The following investigators are available for questions about this study,
M-F, 8:00 AM- 4:30 PM
Emily Whelan (225) 578-8816
Dr. Carol O’Neil (225) 578-1631
Dr. Annrose Guarino (225) 578- 1425
25. Purpose of the Study: The purpose of this research project is to explore Louisiana’s FSP
and NSLP response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and assess pre-disaster plan and postdisaster implementation in order to provide insight to the strengths and weakness of the
disaster response.
26. Number of subjects: 30
27. Study Procedures: Qualitative questions will be asked during an interview between the
principal investigator and the administrator. The interview will be taped and transcribed
verbatim. Impressions provided by the expert informant will be used to provide insight
to the strengths and weakness of the disaster response.
28. Risks: There are no known physical or psychological risks associated with this study.
None of the questions are of a personal or clinical nature.
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****** TURN OVER FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ******
29. Right to Refuse: Subjects may choose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at
any time. Participants may also choose not to answer specific questions from the
interview.
30. Privacy: Results of the study may be published. Identifying information will be included
in the publication and are not confidential. Results will be released to the participants of
the study and may be used in a presentation.

The study has been discussed with me and all my questions have been answered. I may direct
additional questions regarding study specifics to the investigators. If I have questions about
subjects' rights or other concerns, I can contact Michael Keenan, LSU AgCenter Institutional
Review Board, (225) 578-1708. I agree to participate in the study described above and
acknowledge the investigator's obligation to provide me with a signed copy of this consent
form.

_____________________________________________________________________
Signature of Subject
Date

Signature of Interviewer

Date
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Summary of Instructional Waivers and Policy Changes for the NSLP as Released by the USDA
Release Date
Waiver Title
Policy Changes
Dates Effective
August 31, 2005 Emergency
September 30, 2005
1. Schools unable to maintain normal
Feeding of
accountability systems, but that are able to
School Children
operate will be allowed to serve all meals free.
in Areas
2. Meal pattern flexibility is allowable. Schools
Devastated by
may be exempt from milk and other
Hurricane
component requirements.
Katrina
3. Households certified for emergency food
stamps are automatically eligible for free
school meals.
4. When a large number of homeless children are
attending the school, due to loss or damage of
property, schools may keep a list to document
free meal eligibility in lieu of individual
applications.
5. Displaced families may be considered
homeless. However if they are staying with a
host family, will have to submit a revised
application to be eligible.
September 7,
School Meals
1. Local educational agencies that are in
August and
2005
Programs:
jurisdictions which are federally declared
September claims
Verification
disaster areas are not required to do any
may be submitted by
Procedures and
verification.
December 31, 2005,
Hurricane
2. Local educational agencies that have
without a request for
Katrina
experienced an influx of students from areas
waiver of the 60-day
affected by Hurricane Katrina, State agencies
deadline due
have the authority to extend the deadline and
completion of claims to later in the school year Verification was not
or to waive it if warranted.
required for the
3. Families who have been displaced due to
remainder of the
Hurricane Katrina are not subject to
2005-2006 school
verification because they are considered
year
homeless.
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Hurricane
Katrina

Katrina

September 15,
2005

September 22,
2005

September 26,
2005

Extension of 30
Day Limit for
Initial Carryover of
Previous Year’s
Eligibility due
to Hurricane
Katrina
School Meals
Programs:
Extension of
Waivers Due
to Emergency
Conditions
Caused by
Hurricane
Katrina

School
Meal
Programs:
Hurricane
Rita:
Extending
Waivers
from
Hurricane
Katrina
October 28, 2005 Revised –
Replacement of

Extension of waiver released on August 31, 2005

Additional 30 days
(60 days total:
October 30, 2005)

Katrina

1. Extension of waiver released on August 31,
2005
2. Extension of waiver released on September 7,
2005

November 30, 2005

Katrina

October Claims: Jan.
31, 2006
November Claims:
Feb 31, 2006

Defined Areas Affected: the areas’ hurricane
impact determined by the state agency in terms of
displaced persons, food shortages, etc.
Defined Declared Disaster Area: declared
disaster areas are those counties or parishes
designated on the Federal Emergency
Management Agency website
Extension of waivers issued as a result of
Hurricane Katrina to areas affected by Hurricane
Rita.

This memorandum supersedes the October 19,
2005 release of the FNS Commodity Program
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November 30, 2005

Rita

October Claims: Jan.
31, 2006
November Claims:
Feb 31, 2006

Submission of
commodities used for

Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita

Commodities
due to Natural
Disasters

November 29,
2005

School Meals
Programs:
Second
Extension of
Waivers Due to
Emergency
Conditions
Caused by
Hurricanes
Katrina and
Rita

Disaster Manual: States affected by hurricanes
are to follow the procedures outlined below to
replace commodities lost or made unfit for
consumption as a result of the disasters.
1. Commodities Used for Congregate Feeding
and Household Distribution: FNS will replace
commodities from inventory that were used
for approved disaster congregate feeding or
FNS-approved household distribution. FNS
cannot replace non-USDA commodities used
for these purposes, nor to reimburse
organizations for the other costs, including
labor costs.
2. Lost or Damaged Commodities: FNS does not
have the authority to replace USDA or nonUSDA commodities that are lost, destroyed,
contaminated or otherwise rendered unusable
in a disaster due to flooding, fire, wind, power
outage, or other cause.
Extension of waivers following a presidentiallydeclared disaster and schools that are phasing-in
operations:
1. Schools may serve all meals free to
attending children if unable to maintain
normal accountability systems.
2. Schools have meal pattern flexibility.
Normal accountability systems defined: prehurricane system that were not operable
Homeless defined: any child who was designated
homeless by the liaison is eligible for free meals
for the school year and are not subject to the 45day re-evaluation. Children certified by school
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congregate feeding
and household
distribution: within
30 days from the
federally declared
disaster

States may extend the Hurricanes Katrina
above provisions
and Rita
until February 28,
2006, as needed, on a
school by school
basis.
Schools in either the
disaster areas or that
were closed due to
use as shelters may
extend the eligibility
from the previous
school year an
additional 30

administrators based on their homeless status due
to the hurricanes are subject to the 45-day reevaluation.
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operating days from
the date school
returns to session.
This is in effect for
the remainder of
School Year 2005-06.

APPENDIX I
NSLP SUMMARY OF SFA LOSSES BY PARISH

Parish
St. Charles SFA
East Baton
Rouge Parish
SFA

Tangipahoa
SFA
St. James SFA
New Orleans
diocese SFA
Cameron SFA
Lafayette
diocese SFA
Food
Distribution
Division

Loss in Dollars
$110,000
$20,000
$5,000
$3,000
$50,000

Reason
Food and labor
Food
Overtime for appliance repairs
Appliance Parts
Labor per day while schools were closed
Revenue per day while schools were closed

$100,000
$300,000

Food

$2,000
$1,700
$5 Million
$270,000
$93,000
$28,000 (example)
$42,000
Several thousand dollars

Food (Katrina)
Food (Rita)
Large equipment
Purchased food
Commodity Food
March reimbursement income
Food
Food

$16,000-$20,000

Commodities foods
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Release Date Waiver Title

Policy Changes

Population Included

September 2,
2005

LA DSS Offers
Emergency
Food Stamp
Assistance

1. Description of disaster
assistance

Those living or evacuated
from the affected area

September 7,
2005

National
Evacuee Policy

1. Food stamp benefits
are available and
certifiable under the
state where evacuee is
currently living
2. States not running a
Disaster FSP must
treat evacuees as a
priority

September
14, 2005

Expanded
Disaster
Evacuee Policy

1. Replaces waiver
released on September
2, 2005.
2. State agencies are to
certify evacuees from
areas affected by the
disaster under
expedited service
rules.
3. The applicant and

Residents of Louisiana
Thru October
disaster parishes: Acadia,
31, 2005
Ascension, Assumption,
Calcasieu, Cameron, East
Baton Rouge, East Feliciana,
Iberia, Iberville, Jefferson,
Jefferson Davis, Lafayette,
Lafourche, Livingston,
Orleans, Pointe Coupee,
Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St.
Charles, St. Helena, St.
James, St. John, St. Mary, St.
Martin, St. Tammany,
Tangipahoa, Terrebonne,
Vermilion, Washington,
West Baton Rouge, and West
Feliciana
Evacuated families.
Apply thru
October 31,
2005 and
benefits for 3
months
including
month of
application.
Beginning
January 2006
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Dates
Effective
One week

Hurricane
Katrina

Katrina

Katrina

issuances,
participating
households
must satisfy
non-disaster
verification
requirements.

his/her family may be
certified as a
household separate
from whom they are
living and purchasing
and preparing food
4. Temporary exemption
from the work rules.
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APPENDIX K
NSLP ENROLLMENT CHANGES

Yearly: October 2002-October 2005
Monthly: December 2005-May 2006
Cameron Parish Student Enrollment Patterns from October 2002-May 2006
(Pre-storms)
Total Students Free Lunch
Reduced Lunch Displaced
Students
October, 2002
1,871
516 (27.58%)
224 (11.97%)
n/a
October, 2003
1,851
548 (29.61%)
250 (13.51%)
n/a
October 2004
1,843
573 (31.09%)
276 (14.98%)
n/a
October 2005
1
1 (100%)
0 (0%)
0
December 2005
1,447
1,437 (99.31%) 0 (0%)
1,437
January 2006
1,469
1,455 (99.05%) 0 (0%)
1,422
February 2006
1,499
1495 (99.73%) 0 (0%)
1,495
March 2006
1,498
1,495 (99.80%) 2 (.13%)
1,425
April 2006
1,511
1,508 (99.80%) 2 (.13%)
1,430
May 2006
1,496
1,492 (99.60%) 2 (.13%)
2

Cameron Parish Student Enrollment
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East Baton Rouge Parish student enrollment patterns pre- and post- Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita
Total
Student
Enrollment
52,530
46,910
46,928
51,864
50,681
50,320
50,022
49,142
48,580
48,339

Month
October, 2002
October, 2003
October, 2004
October, 2005
December, 2005
January, 2006
February, 2006
March, 2006
April, 2006
May, 2006

Free
Lunch
31,624
30,332
30,031
37,734
36,308
35,665
35,066
33,942
33,254
34,989

Percent
Free
Reduced
Lunch
Lunch
60.20%
4,194
64.66%
3,345
63.99%
3,273
72.76%
3,173
71.64%
3,124
70.88%
3,098
70.10%
3,082
69.07%
3,044
68.45%
3,021
72.38%
2,898

Percent
Reduced Displaced
Lunch
Students
7.98%
7.13%
6.97%
6.12%
5,519
6.16%
4,693
6.16%
4,462
6.16%
4,328
6.19%
3,900
6.22%
3,802
6.00%
3,769

EBR Parish Student Enrollment Patterns
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St. Martin Parish student enrollment patterns pre- and post- Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

Total
Free
Month, Year
Students
Lunch
October, 2002
8,715
5,169
October, 2003
8,774
5,312
October, 2004
8,632
5,226
October, 2005
9,010
5,704
December, 2005
8,808
5,505
January, 2006
8,803
5,478
February, 2006
8,730
5,502
March, 2006
8,675
5,456
April, 2006
8,623
5,429
May, 2006
8,578
5,388

Percent
Percent
Free
Reduced Reduced Displaced
Lunch
Students
Lunch
Lunch
59.31%
855
9.81%
60.54%
864
9.85%
60.54%
784
9.08%
63.31%
745
8.27%
333
62.50%
749
8.50%
200
62.23%
747
8.49%
179
63.02%
730
8.36%
182
62.89%
728
8.39%
176
62.96%
721
8.36%
167
62.81%
717
8.36%
0

St. Martin Parish Student Enrollment
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St. James Parish student enrollment patterns pre- and post- Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

Month, Year
October, 2002
October, 2003
October, 2004
October, 2005
December, 2005
January, 2006
February, 2006
March, 2006
April, 2006
May, 2006

Total
Student
Enrollment
4,155
4,156
4,113
4,293
4,231
4,197
4,180
4,157
4,153
4,159

Free
Lunch
2,586
2,707
2,706
2,609
2,655
2,651
2,653
2,640
2,640
2,642

Percent
Free
Lunch
62.24%
65.13%
65.79%
60.77%
62.75%
63.16%
63.47%
63.51%
63.57%
63.52%

Percent
Reduced Reduced Displaced
Lunch
Students
Lunch
284
6.84%
282
6.79%
278
6.76%
270
6.29%
260
273
6.45%
219
271
6.46%
193
271
6.48%
179
271
6.52%
163
268
6.45%
157
268
6.44%
159

St. James Parish Student Enrollment
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Tangipahoa Parish student enrollment patterns pre- and post- Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

Total
Free
Month, Year
Students
Lunch
October, 2002
18,022 10,727
October, 2003
18,571 10,982
October, 2004
18,654 11,316
October, 2005
19,580 11,648
December, 2005
19,409 12,004
January, 2006
19,282 12,134
February, 2006
19,150 11,955
March, 2006
19,120 11,890
April, 2006
19,116 12,221
May, 2006
19,014 12,178

Percent
Percent
Free
Reduced Reduced Displaced
Lunch
Students
Lunch
Lunch
59.52%
1,485
8.24%
59.14%
1,560
8.40%
60.66%
1,533
8.22%
59.49%
1,429
7.30%
1,079
61.85%
1,443
7.43%
1,081
62.93%
1,444
7.49%
982
62.43%
1,438
7.51%
989
62.19%
1,440
7.53%
971
63.93%
1,398
7.31%
991
64.05%
1,385
7.28%
992

Tangipahoa Parish Student Enrollment
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St. Charles Parish student enrollment patterns pre- and post- Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

Month
October, 2002
October, 2003
October, 2004
October, 2005
December, 2005
January, 2006
February, 2006
March, 2006
April, 2006
May, 2006

Total
Student
Enrollment
9,757
9,757
9,797
9,999
9,977
9,945
9,885
9,846
9,775
9,761

Free
Lunch
3,760
3,760
3,806
4,283
4,206
4,152
4,075
656
640
637

Percent
Free
Reduced
Lunch
Lunch
38.54%
771
38.54%
771
38.85%
864
42.83%
826
42.16%
819
41.75%
811
41.22%
807
8.18%
4,020
7.26%
4,161
7.20%
4,144

Percent
Reduced
Lunch
7.90%
7.90%
8.82%
8.26%
8.21%
8.15%
8.16%
40.83%
42.57%
42.45%

Displaced
Students

728
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Reduced
Lunch
Displaced
Students

APPENDIX L
FSP ENROLLMENT CHANGES

Total FSP cases by household, total recipients, average benefit, and percentage of
case closed due to recipient moving out of state
Total FSP
Total FSP
Average
Percentage
Households
Recipients in Received
of Cases
in Louisiana Louisiana
Benefit
Closed **
January 2003
232,422
612,442
$233.84
1.13%
September 2003
247,310
646,446
$237.28
2.29%
January 2004
258,093
669,067
$239.89
1.69%
September 2004
268,877
664,544
$243.47
2.38%
January 2005
276,308
706,561
$251.47
1.62%
August 2005
278,311
728,311
$247.50
2.05%
September 2005
288,412
731,524
$290.49
3.04%
October 2005
292,476
740,319
$316.51
18.01%
November 2005
281,150
707,252
$294.63
25.07%
December 2005
261,709
654,568
$270.83
21.93%
January 2006
258,251
642,222
$249.90
31.43%
February 2006
256,373
635,855
$249.34
7.39%
March 2006
254,835
632,240
$248.47
3.90%
April 2006
251,710
624,623
$247.99
3.84%
May 2006
241,724
597,370
$245.44
2.82%
June 2006
237,754
588,486
$253.51
2.87%
** This number represents the number of cases closed because the recipient moved out of the
state of Louisiana.
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Total Monthly FSP Cases by Thibodaux Region and Parishes
Total
Ascension Assumption Lafourche St. Charles St. James St. John Terrebonne
Region
September 2003*
17,555
2,412
1,418
3,701
1,609
1,244
2,174
4,997
January 2004*
18,590
2,570
1,455
3,945
1,649
1,280
2,353
5,338
September 2004*
20,348
2,819
1,596
4,249
1,821
1,408
2,625
5,830
January 2005*
21,085
2,972
1,634
4,530
1,910
1,404
2,634
6,001
September 2005
22,011
3,168
1,747
4,720
1,970
1,426
2,786
6,176
October 2005
22,557
3,294
1,804
4,736
2,049
1,469
2,978
6,227
November 2005
21,648
3,274
1,768
4,550
1,834
1,433
2,820
5,969
December 2005
21,921
3,359
1,798
4,604
1,885
1,427
2,860
5,992
January 2006
21,951
3,309
1,800
4,648
1,917
1,419
2,875
5,983
February 2006
21,963
3,326
1,787
4,699
1,915
1,414
2,892
5,930
March 2006
21,940
3,328
1,769
4,729
1,890
1,419
2,852
5,953
April 2006
21,612
3,270
1,746
4,634
1,871
1,411
2,821
5,859
May 2006
20,646
3,147
1,652
4,460
1,774
1,345
2,739
5,529
June 2006
20,449
3,142
1,661
4,418
1,756
1,361
2,674
5,437
* The Region was redistricted for FY 2005. September 2003-January 2005 totals for the Thibodaux Region do not include
St. Mary’s Parish, which prior to FY 2005 was included in the Thibodaux Region.
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Total Monthly FSP Cases by Lake Charles Region and Parishes*
Region Lake Charles Allen Beauregard Calcasieu Cameron Jeff Davis
September 2003
12,757
1,320
1,357
8,272
234
1,574
January 2004
13,402
1,402
1,375
8,666
279
1,680
September 2004
14,035
1411
1437
9200
305
1682
January 2005
14,344
1476
1422
9354
320
1772
September 2005
14,652
1,532
1,527
9,541
301
1,751
October 2005
14,504
1,521
1,532
9,419
291
1,741
November 2005
13,234
1,478
1,499
8,349
248
1,660
December 2005
13,606
1,563
1,579
8,461
231
1,772
January 2006
13,494
1,606
1,604
8,325
214
1,745
February 2006
13,523
1,592
1,549
8,391
178
1,739
March 2006
13,426
1,589
1,534
8,391
178
1,739
April 2006
13,464
1,599
1,521
8,425
166
1,753
May 2006
13,070
1,518
1,467
8,272
151
1,662
June 2006
12,755
1,508
1,433
8,025
140
1,649
* The regions and parishes were restricted for FY 2005-2006. Those parishes that were not included
in the region after FY 2005, were not included in the table
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Total Monthly FSP Cases by Orleans Region and Parishes/Districts
Total
Jefferson
Orleans
Plaquemines St.
Jefferson Orleans Orleans
Orleans
Region Westbank
Midtown
Parish
Bernard Eastbank Algiers Uptown
Gentilly
District
Parish
District District*
District*
September
61,839
9,434
11,210
1,146
2,501
5,492
4,591
11,974
8,478
2003 †
January 2004
64,747
10,142
11,759
1,218
2,206
5,814
12,148
7,365
8,908
†
September
65,838
10,320
12,058
1,251
2,719
6,109
4,724
11,961
9,499
2004 †
January 2005
68,749
11,197
12,761
1,355
2,909
6,290
4,990
12,485
10,321
†
September
68,880
11,902
13,977
1,381
3,019
6,339
5,145
13,649
13,468
2005
October
67,694
11,771
13,729
1,342
2,951
6,249
5,071
13,374
13,207
2005
November
61,440
11,396
12,478
1,074
2,694
5,956
3,739
12,186
11,917
2005
December
38,364
8,218
6,563
1,098
1,700
4,718
3,295
6,377
6,386
2005
January 2006 35,726
8,765
6,963
1,172
1,457
4,829
3,220
4,923
4,406
February
34,496
8,894
7,473
1,213
1,272
5,033
3,302
3,940
3,369
2006
March 2006
34,084
9,373
13,617
1,257
1,206
5,162
3,469
0
0
April 2006
32,892
9,304
12,614
1,152
1,152
5,081
3,492
0
0
May 2006
30,168
8,915
11,137
1,041
1,041
4,773
3,300
0
0
June 2006
27,789
8,440
9,658
884
884
4,496
3,408
0
0
* After Hurricane Katrina, the Orleans Region was redistricted and the Orleans Uptown and Gentilly Districts were redesigned to
be included in other districts.
† Includes Total reflects the city of New Orleans including the Orleans Downtown District office which was eliminated in FY
2005.
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